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FOREIGN POLICY POSITIONS ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES

Paris PROJECT in French Jan 80 pp 40-55

[Article by F. Beauchataud, G. Florent and J. Pelletier: "Some 'Horizontal Policies'"]

[Excerpt] The New Disarmament Policy

For 17 years France has remained aloof from the Conference of the Geneva Disarmament Committee, whose organization and methods it has called into question (and whose results have, moreover, been very disappointing). In 1978 it seemed appropriate to regain the initiative,* in the light of a situation characterized by the following factors:

- a. The conclusion--since the war--of a very limited number of disarmament agreements, which provided in most cases for limitations to be imposed in areas not yet affected by the armaments race (for example, space and the ocean floor) but left a virtually unlimited field open to development of the capacity for destruction in the other sectors.
- b. A quantitative and qualitative increase in nuclear and conventional arms, representing in and of itself a growing danger both for the industrialized countries and for the Third World.

* PROJET has previously devoted two articles to the revival of the disarmament policy:

- a. J. Klein, "France and Disarmament," May 1978.
- b. J. Paucot, "Disarmament at the United Nations," November 1978.

For a more detailed presentation, we refer you to the above articles.

c. A level of military expenditure that is increasingly difficult to accept, given the needs of economic development as well as the outrageous disparity between the total expenditure on armament and the total aid granted to the most deprived countries.

d. Lastly, as a reaction to these negative factors, a more clear-cut awareness--on the part of the members of the international community--of the need for getting out of the rut in which the negotiations had become bogged down. This sentiment was particularly strong in the Third World countries, which had prompted the convocation in 1978 of a special session of the United Nations General Assembly on the subject of disarmament.

The French Government could not hope to provide radical and immediate solutions to such a complex problem; moreover, the era of plans for "general and complete disarmament"--generous in their inspiration but with little thought given to human or even geographical considerations--is over. The French proposals--which the President of the Republic himself presented to the 10th special session of the United Nations in New York on 25 May 1978--therefore called for a progressive effort which would, however, strive for efficacy and accordingly be based on the realities of the world as it is.

Giscard d'Estaing initially advocated a reform of the mechanisms for deliberation and negotiation, based on the principle that disarmament should be "everyone's business." This would in particular involve replacement of the CCD [Conference of the Geneva Disarmament Committee]--a closed organization which had become, over the years, merely a chamber for registering decisions by the two American and Soviet cochairmen--by a more open institution that would be more representative of the international community (and in particular of the Third World) and more closely linked to the United Nations, and whose members would be placed on a footing of strict equality.

The president, moreover, stressed two concepts designed to guide the choice--and implementation--of the disarmament measures. The first concept is that every state has a legitimate right to security, and it is therefore illusory to hope to reach a zero level of armament in the near future. The second concept is that the approach to disarmament must take regional situations into consideration. These regions can be identified as follows:

a. The northern hemisphere zone, which contains nuclear armament that plays a role in the equilibration of the respective forces. The objective in this region should be to give priority to achievement of a reduction in the nuclear armament of the two great powers while simultaneously putting an end to the development of conventional armament and to the disparities that have been verified in this connection.

b. The currently nonnuclearized zones, in which an effort should be made to prevent the proliferation of atomic weapons and halt the arms race in conventional weapons--an effort which should take the form of agreements freely negotiated among the countries of the concerned regions. An example of this policy has been provided by the conclusion of the Treaty of Tlatelolco on the denuclearization of Latin America--a treaty which France is pledged to respect.

In keeping with these principles, the president concluded by suggesting a series of specific measures to be put into effect within the framework of the United Nations (projects for the creation of an International Satellite Control Agency, a Disarmament for Development Fund, and an institute for research on disarmament) or at the European level (the project for a "Conference on Disarmament in Europe").

The French proposals were accorded a positive reception, and those reservations which they did elicit--either because of their novelty or because they posed a challenge to gains previously won--did not prevent the French concepts from making considerable headway. Whereas all previous attempts at reform had failed, a new "Committee on Disarmament" in keeping with the criteria desired by the French Government was created in January 1979 and has already held its first two meetings; moreover, there is reason to believe that China will soon decide to take the seat that has been reserved for it on that body. The proposals that were made at the United Nations are all currently under study by the UN secretariat. Lastly, the proposal for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe has become an important element in the dialog concerning security and cooperation which is taking place among the 35 European and American countries that participated in the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe].

10992
CSO: 3100

COMMUNIQUE ISSUED ON SPANISH LABOR DELEGATION ROME VISIT

Rome L'UNITA in Italian 23 Feb 80 p 17

[Text] Rome--Marcelino Camacho, the secretary general of the Workers Committees, the largest Spanish labor union organization, explained yesterday at a press conference the broad lines of his country's labor union and political situation in the context of the European and international situation.

The Spanish labor union movement, said Camacho, is going through a difficult crisis period due to the attempts by big management to divide and weaken the Spanish worker movement, while on the other hand there is taking shape a conservative trend in the government's orientation, in particular on economic policy.

Camacho, who is at present in Italy with a delegation from the Workers Committees, insisted on the necessity of finding once more a "unity of action" between the Workers Committees and the UGT [General Union of Workers] (the union confederation with a socialist majority). A unity--he said--which would permit relaunching a policy of national solidarity to get out of the country's serious economic crisis which "no party can think of facing alone." The Spanish union leader also confirmed the "European choice" of his organization because of the possibility of Spain's admission into the EEC.

During their stay in Italy, the delegation of the Workers Committees, made up of Camacho and the international leader Ariaga, has had meetings with the Italian union leaders. The delegation was received by the secretary generals of the CISL [Italian Confederation of Labor Unions], Pierre Carniti, of the UIL [Italian Union of Labor], Giorgio Benvenuto, and its members talked at length with a delegation from the CGIL [Italian General Confederation of Labor], as well as with the secretary general, Lama, the deputy secretary general, Marianetti and the secretary for international relations, Militello.

In a joint communique, the delegations of the Workers Committees and the CGIL stated that they think "as far as the initiative of the European union movement in particular is concerned" that the European Trade Unions

Confederations (CES) can represent "increasingly an essential point of reference in the struggle of the workers on a continental scale "for full employment, against the perverse effects of inflation and for the consolidation of the democratic institutions. With reference to the request for membership in the CES of the part of the Workers Committees, the CGIL, the communique affirms, has expressed "full support for the admission of the Workers Committees" and "its commitment in this direction under the CGIL-CISL-UIL Federation."

The delegation from the Workers Committees will be received today by Vanni, the president of the Economic and Social Committee of the EEC.

8956

CSO: 3104

PARTIES ON LEFT MUST OFFER CONSTRUCTIVE SECURITY ALTERNATIVE

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 23-24 Feb 80 p 1

[Editorial]

[Text] Credibility is having an alternative to what one is criticizing. By and large this has been missing from the left wing in its assault on the government's security policy. "Leave NATO" is an empty slogan for many people because the left wing offers uncertainty in place of the security many really feel is provided by membership in the alliance. There are some indications that even the left wing does not feel much urgency about quitting. How else can we explain the fact that the security policy debate has been shelved for a decade during which time the arms race took on greater speed and international tension increased steadily?

The protests against NATO's armaments plans would gain in strength if the criticism was based on an evaluation of the threat and plans for dealing with it. With this kind of analysis and ideas the left wing could play a constructive role in the defense debate. Perhaps this would not influence the final result. But the political influence on the general public--the mobilization of a movement opposed to the arms build-up--would make enormous gains. And there is a chance here to exert a direct influence.

An opinion survey conducted for JYLLANDS-POSTEN by Observa gives some indications. Again broad support was found for NATO membership--61 percent for, 23 percent against and 16 percent undecided. But the most interesting thing was that the NATO desire for a 3-percent real annual increase in military budgets had the support of only 43 percent of the population as a whole, while 42 percent were opposed. Among manual and skilled workers 39 percent were for and 45 percent against. Among Social Democrats only 28 percent favored such an increase--a clear majority of 53 percent opposed the idea. That should make party leaders stop and think--and it shows the great opportunities for a credible activity on the part of the left wing.

In Friday's edition Steen Folke of the Leftist Socialists replied to an editorial printed last Saturday. He felt that if VS [Leftist Socialists] and SF [Socialist People's Party] join the Social Democrats in a defense agreement it would be a betrayal of the antimilitaristic movements. It wasn't exactly direct participation in a compromise that the editorial had in mind. The question that needs clarification is whether or not VS and SF would vote against a new defense act. If they abstain from voting the Social Democrats, the Radical Liberals and the Single-Tax Party have a majority with 82 votes.

This would make these parties responsible for a more sensible new defense arrangement than the insanity being planned by the parties on the right side of the chamber. Naturally the Social Democrats want a broad compromise--but surely not whatever the cost. As the opinion survey showed the price for a compromise with the Conservatives and Liberals might very well be high. And especially considering what would be accomplished by such an agreement--a blind continuation of a defense structure that time and the economy have left far behind.

On page 9 the Swedish military expert, Wilhelm Agrell, outlines a possible Danish alternative security policy. Is that really so unacceptable to VS and SF? And is it entirely inconceivable that these ideas could gain ground among the Social Democrats, the Radical Liberals and the Single-Tax Party?

Steen Folke is against the F-16 plane, supply depots for American soldiers, the growing professionalism of the Danish military, expansion of a real defense industry and the undermining of the official Danish nuclear policy. Does Folke really think the Social Democrats and their elected representatives want such a development? That is very unlikely but they are being forced in that direction because they can't break out of the paths created by Danish security policy in the postwar period.

It is in periods of crisis that new policies emerge and Denmark is definitely in the midst of a crisis. Agrell suggests solutions for precisely the problems singled out by Steen Folke. There are particularly good reasons for emphasizing the revival of universal military service. It would be difficult to put Agrell's defense into a defense of the capital interests which the existing military could be used for. But it isn't just Folke's problems that would be solved. The fact is that the existing military system is also in the midst of a crisis that is very disturbing to many military people. And the "more alliance-dominated defense" that Social Democrat Knud Damgaard feels is necessary is disturbing to people who are far from sharing Folke's political views. For more integration also means a greater limitation of Denmark's national sovereignty.

It is possible that Agrell's ideas could be challenged. But that is not the central question arising from the interview. That is: why don't these ideas figure at all in Danish defense planning?

Groups within the Social Democrats, the Radical Liberals, the Single-Tax Party, SF and VS could introduce them. And they would find out that even people within the military system are familiar with these ideas. That was indicated by the comments in the paper dealing with security policy issues concerning Major Graabaek's ideas. The F-16 and other expensive equipment are also unpopular in military circles where the standard of living is deteriorating because there isn't enough money to pay decent wages--the money goes for capital-intensive junk that can be destroyed in a few seconds.

It is necessary to consider carefully what is central to an antimilitaristic attitude. The purely pacifist element is morally worthy of respect but in the short run lacking in realistic alternatives. But if we want a military defense it should be one that does not threaten our society. That is just what our present mini-copy of the superpowers' armed forces is doing. Alternatives are desperately needed in security policy deliberations and these are best introduced by people who are not infected with NATO habits of thinking. Taking a concrete position is not just up to a few brave politicians at Christiansborg. To a much greater extent it is the ideas and the pressure the popular organizations of their parties can create.

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CSO: 3106

OIL EXPLORATION OFF EAST GREENLAND IN LIMBO

Godthab GRONLANDSPOSTEN in Danish 14 Feb 80 p 7

[Text] Oil exploration off East Greenland has been placed in limbo pending clarification of concession terms.

"We are realistic and we have notified the Greenland Ministry's raw materials administration that we are willing to discuss a revision of our 1952 concession," director Roberto Kayser of Nordic Mining Company told GRONLANDSPOSTEN.

"We are aware that the concession terms in the 1952 concession may be too favorable for the company. We have also told the raw materials administration that. On the other hand we have said that we cannot agree to a concession of the same type as that in effect for the oil companies taking part in the exploration off West Greenland. A project in our concession area in East Greenland is inconceivable under such terms.

"Therefore we expect that a revised concession will lie somewhere between our current concession and those in effect in West Greenland," Roberto Kayser said.

Waiting for a Move

He added that Nordic Mining had conveyed these views to the raw materials administration. "Now we are waiting for a move. As long as the situation surrounding our concession is unclear there are strict limits to what we will do with regard to the possible oil project in East Greenland," Kayser said.

He told us that Nordic Mining has declared its willingness to have the revised concession subordinated to a general total plan for Greenland's potential gas and oil deposits.

Present Concession

The Nordic Mining concession went into effect in 1952 and runs until the year 2002. It gives the company sole rights to the exploration for and extraction of all metals, coal, oil and mineral deposits with the exception of cryolite and minerals containing uranium, thorium and other radioactive elements.

If Nordic Mining had enough capital of its own to conduct oil explorations in East Greenland it is possible that altering the concession terms would not have come up. But the company has to enter into economic agreements with other firms with available capital, among them the American Arco Company. And under the terms of the concession this means that the raw materials administration can call for the renegotiation of the concession.

Exploration Program Ready

Nordic Mining in cooperation with Arco has prepared a program for oil exploration in East Greenland. But the two companies have put the preparations on ice until the concession matter has been clarified.

Nordic Mining's concession area extends from Cape Brewster about 50 km south of Scoresbysund to a point a little north of Clavering Island--a coastline of almost 500 km. And the concession area extends almost 300 km into the country.

The ocean shelf off the concession area has been pronounced promising by several geologists with regard to oil deposits. The geological structure could correspond to areas west of Norway where large oil finds have been made.

6578

CSU: 3106

GREENLAND MINERAL EXPLORATION FINDS COPPER, SCHEELITE

Godthab GRONLANDSPOSTEN in Danish 14 Feb 80 p 7

[Text] Copper deposits were found on Wegener Peninsula and scheelite deposits in Alpefjorden.

The studies made by Nordic Mining Company in East Greenland during the summer of 1979 are being analyzed and they report favorable results for copper and scheelite deposits while the results were disappointing with regard to molybdenum.

Director Roberto Kayser of Nordic Mining said that a test hole had been drilled to a depth of 1 km in Malmbjerget, about 40 km southwest of Mestersvig. "A drill hole that deep is unusual for a mineral deposit. The drilling did not lead to the results we had expected. We did not come across ore containing molybdenum as we had hoped. But that does not mean the ore cannot be found somewhere else in the mountain and studies will continue this summer," director Kayser said.

"With regard to copper deposits on Wegener Peninsula the 1979 studies have produced good results and we are fast approaching the time when we can start a real drilling program. This is a decisive phase in mineral exploration because it requires very large investments."

Director Kayser added that geological studies in 1979 support theories concerning the main location of copper ore deposits. But more precise estimates require more drilling at the site. The accessible copper ore deposits suggest that the ore has a quality similar to that justifying mining operations elsewhere in the world.

The preliminary estimate of ore reserves also suggests that they are sizable enough that extraction would be indicated in other locations. The ore has also been shown to contain some silver. With the skyrocketing prices of silver this could be important when a decision is being made about mining.

Scheelite

Finally mining company geologists have found very promising deposits of the mineral scheelite which in turn contains some wolfram. Wolfram is an important metal in the production of steel. The scheelite project is being conducted with help from EEC and the studies will continue in 1980. It is possible the program will be further expanded to include studies in 1981. In all EEC has supplied 1.8 million kroner for the explorations which are being made in an area near Alpefjorden.

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CSO: 3106

SWEDISH MILITARY EXPERT AGRELL SEES OUTMODED MILITARY CONCEPTS

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 23-24 Feb 80 p 9

[Article by Jorgen Dragsdahl]

[Text] Are budget cuts weakening our defense or are the culprits lack of imagination and outmoded concepts? Swedish expert Wilhelm Agrell tells us how Danish military forces can be improved--for less money.

The "Nordic balance" is not based on the military strength of the individual Nordic lands but on what the superpowers do in this region. For this reason the NATO arms storage plan is a threat to the existing balance because it involves the Nordic countries more directly in confrontations between the superpowers.

The smartest thing Denmark could do is to withdraw from the NATO military command structure--as France and Greece have done--and build up an entirely new defense system based on a small emergency force and a large militia.

Swedish military expert Wilhelm Agrell said this to INFORMATION. For several years he worked for the Swedish defense command and now is associated with the Defense Policy Institute at Lund University. Last year his book "If War Doesn't Come" (published by Liber Forlag, Stockholm) caused quite a stir in Sweden. In the book he reviewed the security policy situation in Scandinavia and outlined a detailed military alternative to Sweden's present defense system. Agrell is a frequent participant in the defense debate conducted by the Swedes in the 1970's because economic and important political developments have rocked the foundation for Sweden's previous security policy.

Does NATO Serve Denmark?

"The debate on the new Danish defense system brings new relevance to the question of what role Denmark plays for NATO and what role NATO plays

for Denmark. It is not immediately apparent that their interests coincide," Agrell said.

"When one has arranged security policy in a certain way for a long period, habit becomes a goal in itself. It is hard to break through with the fundamental analysis: how is NATO helping Denmark? The security policy debate can easily end up concentrating on minor adjustments in the present defense system.

"The plans for massive reinforcements and the storage of military equipment indicate an increased interest in Scandinavia on the part of the superpowers. The security policy pattern in Scandinavia is changing. The balance is shifting. The Nordic balance does not depend on the arms level of the individual Nordic lands. It is based on what the superpowers do in Scandinavia--or on what they haven't done because they were not competing in Scandinavia.

Soviet Arms Build-up

"The Soviet arms build-up in the area is hardly directed against Scandinavia alone. The Soviet Union has some of the most vital facilities for a strategic nuclear war on the Kola Peninsula. The forces protecting them are inadequate if the Soviet Union wants to attack Norway and Sweden. The Soviet build-up in the Baltic Sea should also be viewed in a global context. Some of the most important shipyards for the repair of combat vessels and the construction of new ones are located along the coast. There has been a lot of talk about landing vessels. But in the first place they are constructed in the Baltic and tested there without necessarily being intended for use against Sweden or Denmark. For example the big landing vessel 'Ivan Rogov' is an oceangoing landing ship similar to many such ships owned by the United States. The most likely eventuality is that it will be used internationally but even so it is included in the debate on Nordic conditions. Finally, Norway, Sweden and Denmark have all been strengthening their armed forces and are still doing so, so one can't say this is a unilateral build-up of the threat to the Nordic countries.

"In general the discussion of military balance has been burdened with a fundamental error. One can never arrive at a stable balance because the other side never views the balance of forces in the same way.

Scandinavia Involved at Early Stage

"One cannot say that what NATO is doing now in Denmark and Norway will increase the risk of war. But if war breaks out Scandinavia will be involved at a very early stage if present plans are carried out. The other side will have to anticipate the reinforcements. Doing nothing is a poor alternative. Denmark's slim chance is that an attacker would use his forces against the primary enemy. The Russians have read their

Clausewitz thoroughly. They know that one should strike the most dangerous threat first. NATO's main force is in central Europe today but the new plans will make the picture more diffuse.

"Another dangerous aspect of the NATO plans is that the more one relies on an automatic response in war situations the harder it is to control. How much power would the Danish government really have with regard to allied access to the storage depots? By increasing the potential threat to the Soviet Union from Scandinavia one increases the chance of a very sudden outbreak of war. Both sides work out standard procedures for military moves and countermoves which in reality push civilian decision-makers into the background.

"Apparently the Danish defense is loosely based on being a part of NATO. But are NATO's global maneuvers compatible with Denmark's interest in guaranteeing the survival of its people?

National Suicide

"The philosophy of the superpowers is that one should defend oneself to the death. But a small country has limits to its resistance. Is it reasonable to require national suicide?

"For some time the balance of Danish defense has been shifted to Jutland. This means that Danish officers think only in NATO terms. NATO goals have been placed above Danish goals. The command post in Karup has become more important to the officers than the one for Copenhagen and the islands where most of the people live.

"I feel that most of the military planning being done is based on out-moded concepts. Nuclear weapons are pushed into the background while they plan for a war resembling World War II--a lengthy phase in which nuclear weapons are not used and the participants fight a war of fixed positions. If we follow this line of logic it will lead to tangible consequences for Denmark. The country has an unfortunate strategic position because it can control ship movement from the Baltic. Imagine a situation in which the Soviet Union acts in accordance with this logic and quickly occupies the Danish islands. NATO plans mean that this could lead to the stationing of large American forces in Jutland. The superpowers would then clash on Danish soil. You would have a colossal battle and tactical nuclear weapons might be used. But even without the use of nuclear arms the destruction would be enormous because in some respects the new conventional weapons have a similar explosive force. Is that in the interests of Denmark?

"Denmark's geographic location is an argument for your having a military defense system. But not the kind Denmark has today. First of all it is important for Denmark to avoid a nuclear war on its own territory.

There is less risk of this if you don't have targets worth using nuclear weapons against. Participation in NATO provides Denmark with such targets. There are command bunkers for directing the fight outside of the Danish area. Storage depots are another obvious target. The expansion of air bases and the placement of large numbers of American planes there provides another target.

Freedom of Action

"Denmark could get much more freedom of action if you like France and Greece withdraw from the integrated NATO military command structure. This integration is a threat to Denmark. If anyone feels that membership in NATO provides some security against an isolated attack on Danish territory there is nothing contractual that prevents you from retaining an affiliation. International treaties give free passage through Danish waters and as long as you respect those treaties you will have less to fear than you do now. You would represent less of a threat to the East. The primary goal of Danish security policy should be to keep Denmark out of conflicts. I can't see that NATO's plans will accomplish this.

"In planning Danish defense the nature of the threat must be evaluated. What is Denmark's strategic importance in the age of strategic nuclear weapons? What kind of war will be fought?

"An isolated attack on Denmark or a lengthy conventional major war are the least likely forms of conflict. And in a short nuclear war you are just a target if you have anything to aim at."

Denmark can defend itself against total nuclear war in two ways. We can counteract tensions that could lead to war by exerting a strong influence on the international climate via foreign policy. And we can create a civil defense that would give the people a real chance to survive. Finally an argument can be made for a military preparedness that would not leave the nation totally defenseless in the chaotic period following a nuclear war.

New Danish Defense

In his book Agrell described an alternative Swedish defense consisting of a small emergency force and a large decentralized militia. In principle the ideas can also be applied to Denmark, he said, although special Danish conditions provide both advantages and drawbacks that would require changes in certain respects.

According to Agrell's model a realistic goal for a Danish military defense system would be a force that would prevent an attacker in a major political crisis from walking in and occupying Denmark without resistance during the initial phase. The military defense would prevent the assailant from reaching his goal quickly, gaining time so that other

security policy measures can be employed. By resorting to international opinion, the United Nations, the attacker's major opponent, direct negotiations, etc. the cost of the aggression will increase and the conditions for restoring peace will be guaranteed. In addition, in peacetime the armed forces serve to maintain Danish sovereignty and act as a warning service that can advise the political authorities if an attack is in the wind.

This description of defense objectives places political aspects in the center of the picture. In this context security policy means that Denmark would work actively for detente and acquire close international friends through aid to developing countries among other things. A high foreign policy profile will make military pressure more difficult in times of crisis and place a high political price on total aggression.

Universal Military Service

There are two problems underlying Agrell's defense proposal that can be turned around so they act as advantages. The first is universal military service which has been eroded by developments in the economy and in military structure. The second is military technological developments that have made many weapons systems both extremely expensive (the F-16, for example) and highly vulnerable because other modern weapons (such as missiles) can quickly knock them out of action. The latter problem is dealt with in more detail in INFORMATION's issues supplement on security policy.

Agrell believes that a nation's determination to defend itself is a vital element in its strength. Civilian military service distinguishes itself by giving defense roots in the population and preventing the creation of a socially isolated caste of professional warriors. The importance of universal military service has been undermined in recent years because the rising cost levels and the complex nature of modern weapons led to an increase in professionalism.

Universal military service will be assigned greater importance in the defense alternative. Not everyone will necessarily be called up for military service. In a defense alternative other forms of defense will be included other than purely military defense (defense against economic pressure, catastrophe service, civil disobedience and so forth). It will also go without saying that women will be included in a service obligation to the new total defense.

Technology

The second problem and advantage concerns military technological development. There is much to suggest that the military is standing before as fundamental a threshold as it had to cross when battleships and, later, tanks were introduced. "Modern" versions of the traditional weapons are

extremely expensive. Artillery, planes and tanks are overshadowed by precise technologically-developed weapons. For example a couple of men can take care of a small missile that can cover a distance of many kilometers and put a tank worth millions of kroner out of action.

The characteristics of the new weapons can be summarized as follows:

Great force can be delivered by small units that don't need complicated command systems.

The small units have a high degree of mobility and this makes it hard for the enemy to knock them out in advance (for example with saturation bombing of the deployment area of a large unit).

The new ammunition can cause great destruction in a few seconds over very great distances.

The weapons are precise so that one can avoid the damage caused by such things as an artillery barrage or a tank assault.

They give the defenders of an area a strong position--but don't constitute a big offensive threat against the enemy. The potential of these weapons makes the equipment of the superpowers more vulnerable and therefore they must rely on even greater force in an attack--reducing the temptation to attack peripheral goals.

Finally, the new weapons have the advantage that they are cheap. Price developments for the new electronic systems have been the opposite of those for the "big" weapons systems. For example, look at pocket calculators and stereo systems which have declined somewhat in price in step with developments in technique. The new weapons can also be produced advantageously at home--this saves on foreign currency, creates jobs and does not lead a superpower to develop electronic counterweapons when all that is involved is the equipment of a small power.

Militia

In contrast to the present capital-intensive weapons systems the precision-guided ammunition is simple to handle. Therefore the major element in Agrell's defense system is a militia with only 4-6 months of military service. After this training period the soldiers are placed in small units of 50 to 150 men each, organized locally. Just like the Home Guard today the members would meet regularly. One of the advantages of this militia is that within 12-24 hours it could get up to full strength, eliminating the need for a long mobilization phase. Since the militia would be decentralized aggression could be countered immediately wherever it took place.

A militia along the lines indicated here combined with training in other forms of defense would also make it easier to go over to "underground" resistance fighting in the event that the country is occupied. One can look in vain today in the plans made by the Danish defense command for ideas as to how to respond to an occupation. And this despite the fact that occupation of Denmark and parts of Germany with the existing defenses is already considered probable in NATO circles.

A militia would be very simple. Organization, equipment, forms of leadership, mobilization and combat tasks are simple because such a military system would have a more limited function than the present one.

Emergency Force

Regular maintenance of sovereignty and surveillance tasks would be taken care of by a small emergency force. For Sweden Agrell estimated this would take 5000 men (the militia would have 500,000). Since Denmark is geographically much smaller fewer would be needed in this country--the principle is not to "offset" the enemy's forces man for man but to prevent easy penetration.

In addition to officers and noncommissioned men the emergency force would consist of draftees with a service period of 15-18 months. After they have completed their service these draftees can become noncommissioned officers in a militia corps.

The standing force will have the following composition:

Emergency units of several hundred men. They would be put in where a major enemy attack can be expected. For example Sjaelland could only be invaded in two or three places with ordinary landing vessels due to the depth of the water.

Warning units would man radar units and other equipment that could detect an imminent assault.

Fighter planes (30-40 of them for Sweden) would maintain national sovereignty in peacetime. In case of attack they could be used against airplane transports. The fighters can use civilian airfields since they would not have the present combat tasks.

Missile units for air defense would supplement the militia's lighter anti-aircraft batteries.

Naval vessels would be used for surveillance tasks and to combat the first invasion forces.

Agrell estimates that Swedish military expenses would decline by 50 percent. In the case of Denmark spending would "undoubtedly" also be lower

than the current level because we would save on some of the big expensive weapons systems (tanks, fighter bombers, submarines and so forth).

The transition period could take from 10 to 20 years but "defense" will be improved as soon as the decision is made. A reorganization of military preparedness should be utilized demonstratively in efforts in the area of disarmament. This would be a historic turning point--a move away from the type of military system that acts as a potential threat due to its offensive characteristics.

Is Agrell optimistic? Conservatism in military planning has always hampered the progress of new ideas. It has taken a war to demonstrate the advantages of new weapons. But in this case development can occur differently. The capital-intensive weapons systems are so expensive that they are undermining their own future. And as the NATO plans show modern "defense planning" faces a fundamental dilemma. In the long run it is impossible to bank on a strategy that would destroy the country one supposedly wishes to defend.

6578

CSO: 3106

BAVARIAN FDP REJECTS ELECTION PROGRAM OF PARTY LEADERSHIP

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 17 Mar 80 pp 78-79

[Article: "Ungrateful People"]

[Text] The Bavarian FDP rejects the election program of the Bonn party leadership--the "Neckermann [German mail order house] catalog." Land Chairman Josef Ertl wants to become minister of agriculture in Bonn only under certain conditions.

With 11 years of service Josef Ertl, 55, has been federal minister of agriculture longer than anyone else. Now, with a view to the formation of a government following the Bundestag elections in October, he is beginning to wonder: "Should I continue this kind of life until I am laid to rest?"

While emphasizing that such deliberations concerned the "human side" and had "nothing to do with being weary of holding office," the hefty Liberal, head of the Bavarian FDP, at the same time, following his party's Land executive meeting week before last, tied in his possible readiness to carry on with a condition: the SPD would have to make a "binding commitment: for increased political and financial support of agriculture by a new SPD-FDP federal government.

Only after being "fully familiar with the coalition agreements," said Ertl concerning this point, would he "make a definite decision." FDP Land executive manager Hans-Helmut Roesler added that Ertl had said all along that he would "not join a coalition without deliberation and unconditionally."

The ministerial conditions of their Land chairman are not by any means supported universally by the Bavarian Free Democrats. Many of them are irritated by the fact that the party is to stand up for a part of the population which hardly includes its voters, certainly not in Bavaria. Said FDP spokesman Julian Gyger: "The farmers are ungrateful people."

But on another Bonn subject the Bavarian Liberals, still always rather conservative, share the remonstrative attitude of the agriculture minister,

though in this instance they are addressing themselves to the party leadership in Bonn: the Bavarian FDP is harping at the Bundestag election program ("Freedom and Responsibility") drafted under the supervision of FDP Secretary General Guenter Verheugen.

It is not only that the 82-page draft, as Gyger puts it, constitutes "once again a huge vendor's tray; Ertl says that "it must not be a Neckermann catalog." For example, in addition to such dominant subjects as protection of the environment and energy policy, the authors also concern themselves with the "use of wide-band cable networks," "combating illicit labor" and "quicker procedures for dealing with shoplifting."

Also as far as content is concerned, the Bavarians, as executive manager Roesler puts it, regard several passages as "utterly inadequate," particularly the chapters on family and social policy in which among other things there is mention of "special protection by the state" of the family and "new forms of living together," also by "partners of the same sex." The indignant Ertl: "We cannot only come up with a program for minorities, homosexuals and drug addicts."

The weighty criticism is now to be put in the concrete form of amendment proposals--a kind of counterdraft to the Verheugen program which the Bavarians under the direction of federal executive member Landtag Deputy Ursel want to draft and serve to the FDP national congress in June. The CSU reacted with schadenfreude "in light of the Liberal mess," saying that "after 10 years SPD-FDP coalition" Ertl was "resignedly toying with the thought of being done with it all."

Actually events are not all that dramatic. The Bavarian Liberals who under the leadership of Ertl and Bonn Minister of State in the Foreign Office Hildegard Hamm-Bruecher have parted with the old national Liberal followers and risked a moderate progressive course continue to avoid unduly progressive stands--such as the "church theses" passed by the Hamburg party congress in 1974 which were fought by the Bavarian spokesmen as a "sign of Liberal intellectual bankruptcy" (Hamm-Bruecher) and, not least on the part of Ertl, encountered "fundamental opposition."

And concerning the subject of coalition Ertl now and again would make ambiguous statements, even in reference to Bavaria. Before the Landtag election of 1978 he said: "So if someone at some time or other would like participation by Liberal politics in government responsibility, he has to take into account the possibility of a coalition with the CSU."

Since the FDP Land chairman at the time, following some indignation in the party, came up with the proviso that a coalition with the CSU was out of the question as long as the CSU had an absolute majority, there was some speculation about whether he might perhaps want to keep himself available for a ministerial post in the event of a CDU/CSU government in Bonn.

As for a future federal government, meanwhile, if one can trust the estimate of FDP spokesman Gyger, "at least two-thirds" of the Bavarian Free Democrats favor a continuation of the SPD-FDP coalition. Furthermore the judgement by a member of the FDP Land executive appears realistic when he says that "notwithstanding the unanimity with Ertl concerning our election program, the next coalition will not founder on filling the post of minister of agriculture."

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CSO: 3103

BADEN-WUERTTEMBERG ELECTION RESULTS ANALYZED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 18 Mar 80 p 1

[Article by Johann Georg Reissmueller: "Spaeth Was Closer to the People"]

[Text] The most striking thing is not always the most important. There is great excitement about the Greens entering the Landtag in Stuttgart. Yet a factor more characteristic of conditions in the southwest of the Federal Republic is the fact that the CDU again gained an absolute majority. And it did not maintain itself as the party ruling by itself in Baden-Wuerttemberg because the Land has traditionally belonged to it. Though the CDU has always been the strongest party since the southwestern state came into existence, it did not receive an absolute majority until 1972. The reinforcements were voters who above all wanted to get away from the FDP and were not primarily attracted to the CDU. No party can regard voters as definitely its own, however they were won over--much less such new supporters.

Rather, the CDU has prevailed in Baden-Wuerttemberg because it suited the mood of the Land better than the SPD. Most of the inhabitants of Baden-Wuerttemberg apparently are satisfied by and large with the educational system in their Land. Not a majority certainly, but a considerable part of them must have known something about the quite different school conditions in federal Laender with SPD-FDP governments. A comparison managed to come out in favor of the setups elsewhere only among people closely tied to the SPD or the leftwing of the FDP; it was not something with which these parties were able to gain new supporters.

Added to this is a balanced economic and social structure with comparatively many independent ways of making a living and opportunities to get ahead and determine one's own life style. This is an old achievement of the southwest. But the CDU has furthered it; voters interested in it apparently presumed that the SPD and perhaps also the new FDP, supported more by white-collar employees and civil servants, would not continue with this.

The differences in politics are reflected by the protagonists. With Spaeth, the CDU came closer to the population than the SPD did with Eppler. True,

Eppler is not invariably the antitype as far as the Swabians are concerned (it is a little different with the people of Baden), with quite a few apparently feeling at home with his reflectiveness and respecting it, but the majority considered it to have been enlisted in behalf of a rigorous, demanding lack of realism, which enjoys little popularity in southwest Germany.

On the other side Spaeth caused reservations with his racing breathlessness in word and deed. But these were then generally resolved in a feeling that a man with commonsense and knowledge of the subject was at work here. A majority of southwest Germans did not want to stop him.

However, Spaeth remained below the 1976 CDU election result. Certainly the change from Filbinger to Spaeth cost something. Swabians and also people from Baden are faithful and little inclined coldly to get rid of someone whom they have supported for a dozen years. Filbinger enjoyed great respect among the part of the population inclining toward the CDU. They felt that he was a circumspect head of government, and put up with the fact that occasionally with his baroque manner he behaved more like an autocrat than a father of his people. Perhaps there were not too many voters who wanted to punish the CDU for having dropped Filbinger when he was in straits in summer 1978; more numerous probably are those who no longer found a CDU without Filbinger attractive enough and therefore, for instance, did not go to the polls. Many a Swabian or person from Baden had not got used to the quite different Spaeth in the year and a half during which he had been minister-president. Spaeth's ability to attract people with an egalitarian attitude to a greater extent than Filbinger was able to do cannot have its full effect until that threshold of lack of familiarity is crossed.

There were other factors. Support by many a middle class voter for the FDP, which, whatever its faults, could not be allowed to disappear from parliament; losses to the Greens, with Gruhl's road from the CDU to the environmentalist movement apparently being easier to follow in Baden-Wuerttemberg than elsewhere (though the major support for the Greens probably came from the SPD).

Finally, the low in popularity of the opposition in Bonn. Spaeth had tried to keep his Landtag election free of national politics. Schmidt kept away as far as possible, seeing little point in supporting the unpopular Eppler in a fight which was hardly likely to add measurably to the power of the Bonn coalition. And yet it was impossible to keep this Land election out of the prevailing atmosphere, which is dissociating itself from Strauss and moving toward Schmidt and Genscher.

At first glance the Baden-Wuerttemberg election thus also appears to have given a signal as far as the Bundestag election is concerned. But caution is indicated here. It is not only that time separates the two. How buoyed the Bonn opposition felt after its victory in the southwest in 1972, and how hard was its fall in the autumn thereafter! Nor was Filbinger's triumph in spring 1976 followed by a change of administration to Kohl. There are indications of trends bearing on the outcome in October, but only to a minor degree do they derive from the result of the fight of Spaeth against Eppler and Molok.

REACTION TO BADEN WUERTTEMBERG ELECTION REPORTED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 18 Mar 80 p 3

[Article by Thomas Meyer: "Bonn Speculating About Sunday's Signals--Big Parties Not Exactly in a State of Euphoria"]

[Text] The election night in Stuttgart was followed by a dull day in Bonn. No one in the national capital was delighted by the Baden-Wuerttemberg result. On the contrary, if anything the success of the Greens initially had a paralyzing effect on party pundits. Relatively speaking, the CDU is pained least by Lothar Spaeth's losses, which could have been worse. Under cover of the usual announcement of an "election victory," a big appraisal was also begun in Konrad Adenauer House. Opposite, at the SPD and a couple of blocks away among the Free Democrats the situation is no different. None of the parties has much time left. Saarbruecken, Duesseldorf and finally also the federal elections follow in Stuttgart's footsteps as it were.

The main subject of all analyses in Bonn too is of course the Greens. The fact that they now have seats and votes for the first time in a noncity Land was the shock of this election night and is the reason for Monday's hangover mood. There is busy speculation everywhere about the meaning of the results. There was a direct connection as far as the SPD was concerned. Eppler, it was stated at many a place sarcastically as early as on election night, "probably had been the best election helper" of Hasenclever & Co. Although the SPD is always bent on stressing solidarity, the executive meeting of the Social Democrats in Bonn on Monday morning showed some signs of ostracism.

Relatively speaking, the FDP people were bearing their heads highest. After all, the southwest German Liberals were the only ones among the "established" to score a gain--half a percentage point anyway. The Free Democrats take what they can get. But here too there is little sign of jubilation. The barrel of beer in Thomas Dehler House was gone quickly on Sunday night. Secretary General Verheugen would have got another even though his original condition--9 percent--was not fulfilled.

At the Presidium session Monday morning there was no longer any talk of beer. True, there was delight at the encouraging "upward trend." Everyone praised Genscher for his untiring efforts, and Genscher praised Stuttgart Land Chairman Morlok for his clear line of action. But the FDP people know that the big obstacles are yet to come. Things are starting to get difficult in North Rhine-Westphalia, and the Saarland business is almost causing nightmares among the Liberals. The FDP leadership in Bonn wonders whether the comparatively recent FDP coalition with the CDU in Saarbruecken already has the necessary foundation at the voters' "base." Added to this now is the fact that in the Saarland the SPD will make every effort to make up for the Stuttgart loss. In Thomas Dehler House this is seen as the cause of new dangers for the Free Democrats.

The FDP Presidium was agreed that the only thing of any use was to fight. Even more than in Baden-Wuerttemberg, the national party considers itself challenged. Chairman Genscher anyway has shown his party friends how to fight. Late Sunday night, after the television round, he had come exhausted and still hoarse from campaigning to party headquarters. He had scheduled 56 personal appearances in Baden-Wuerttemberg. There he was, a pitcher of beer in one hand and news agency reports in the other. Genscher drew comparisons, and the comparison clearly pleased him. Wherever he had spoken the FDP results had climbed. But Genscher does not linger over his beer or the figures but soon goes home to Bonn. There new problems are engaging his attention in an intimate circle.

Precisely after the good Stuttgart result, the FDP must make sure that it is not again involved in a coalition debate. The fact that Morlok went into the campaign "uncommitted" and was successful, in Genscher's view, must not become a model. As far as he is concerned, there are also other factors determining the situation in other Laender and particularly nationally. And then there are always still the Greens. It is a consolation to the FDP that wherever the new group has triumphed regionally the FDP more often than not was able to register gains of its own.

The forecasts are now split. On the one hand, Genscher too thinks that the new group will not soon again encounter such favorable prerequisites as in its bastion of Baden-Wuerttemberg. Thus the first big triumph might also turn out to be the climax of the movement. Yet the fact alone that the Greens are now represented in two parliaments may make them presentable in the eyes of many skeptical voters who so far have been unwilling to donate their vote to the "outlanders."

The Greens themselves managed to demonstrate their new self-confidence on the very night of the election. During the round of discussion of the party chairmen in the television studio in Bonn, the telephone rang twice, with the Greens, following their electoral success, demanding to be admitted to the TV roundtable. As yet it was possible to ward them off: after all, they had not so far been established as a national party. Whether, however, one will not have to put one more chair in the studio on 5 October is likely to become the subject of many a bet in Bonn.

BUNDESWEHR INTELLIGENCE AGENCY BEGINS OPERATIONS

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 17 Mar 80 p 18

[Report: "Apel's Spies for a 'Given Hour'"]

[Text] Without any fuss the Bundeswehr [Federal Armed Forces] Intelligence Office (ANBw) whose establishment Defense Minister Apel had announced in spring 1978, has started operations in Bad Neuenahr. Since early this year dozens of specialists have drafted military situation reports every day for the leading staff of the Bundeswehr and for the commanding generals and division commanders.

Their sources are not only the reports of the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) and of the allied intelligence services. Evaluated in addition are the findings of the monitoring units stationed at the inter-German border listening to the radio traffic of the Warsaw Pact armed forces, the films and reports of navy and air force reconnaissance aircraft flying over the Baltic and North Sea and near the border, and the reports of military attaches.

The office, previously known as the "Bundeswehr Telecommunications Office" (AFmBw), according to Hardthoehe plans, is to be expanded systematically until the end of the eighties and equipped with sophisticated computers and modern electronics. Then all military and technological publications of the other side are also to be evaluated more thoroughly than in the past.

The generals also anticipate a considerable increase of information from 18 AWACS early-warning aircraft ordered by NATO which, when employed near the border, can see as far as Warsaw.

"Then," says a Hardthoehe intelligence expert enthusiastically, "we will be able to furnish our commanding officers an almost complete picture of the situation twice a day and to tell them whom they are dealing with at a given hour."

RANSOMING OF PRISONERS IN GDR OPPOSED BY CDU-CSU GROUP

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 17 Mar 80 pp 57-60

[Article: "Dark Clouds--CDU/CSU Deputies Demand a Hearing About the Fate of Prisoners in GDR--Coalition Fears Stop of Ransoming of Prisoners"]

[Text] The "newspaper for Germany" knew exactly what the bad news in the other part of Germany was: the GDR authorities, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE wrote last Wednesday, in passing, in an article about the expatriation of Germans from Czechoslovakia, had "put an end to the ransoming of prisoners."

The facts: Exactly 2 days before, again a transport with more than 40 prisoners had come across the inter-German border from East to West as a result of "special efforts"--the term Bonn has been using for a long time to describe the ransoming of political prisoners from the GDR.

Something like 1,500 GDR citizens a year owe their release from imprisonment and their departure to the Federal Republic to these efforts. Contrary to popular opinion, Bonn pays for this not with foreign currency but with payments in kind, such as raw materials or parts for industrial production.

The fact that recently time and again reports about alleged difficulties in the discreet business have been ghosting in the West German media is the belated result of the amnesty on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the GDR of last October. At that time the business temporarily came to a halt. The East Berliners first wanted to get an idea about which of the candidates for ransom had already been allowed to leave their GDR prisons on the basis of the amnesty.

But now there is an actual threat to the special efforts--thanks to those self-appointed Germany experts of the CDU of the ilk of Manfred Abelein, Claus Jaeger and Hans Graf Huyn, who persistently confuse vociferous accusations against the GDR with inter-German politics.

Their latest litany aims at conditions in East German prisons. And because "nothing official is available" (Jaeger) about this at the Ministry for Inter-German Relations of Social Democrat Egon Franke, they intend to do

their own investigating. On 27 February the CDU/CSU minority in the Bundestag Committee for Inner-German Affairs decided that former political prisoners should report about prison conditions in the GDR at an official hearing in Bonn.

One of the star witnesses is to be military service objector Niko Huebner, who last October was able to leave the GDR on the same day as system critic Rudolf Bahro. Huebner, who since that time has preferably let off steam at CDU/CSU events, and also Bahro, who has meanwhile converted to the Greens, at one time were the subject of serious warnings from East Berlin.

Even before their departure, GDR attorney Wolfgang Vogel had told the West Berlin ABEND that "neither benefits from using a crowbar and making noise." Rather, the confidant of SED chief Erich Honecker engaged in the prisoner deals since 1963 was seeing "very dark clouds on the horizon" for the "many nameless people" now that "it had become fashionable to lower the genuine aid to the level of material for the scandal and gossip market."

It is not only politicians of the coalition who are afraid that the GDR will not be content with warnings when the Germany knights of the CDU and CSU will soon launch their "vociferous election campaign show" (SPD Deputy Hans Buechler) in the Inner-German Committee. Berlin Christian Democrat Johann Baptist Gradi, for example, familiar with the delicate subject as a former minister for all-German questions, can envisage such a hearing at best under the "absolute protection of confidentiality by the committee." Any publicity might be "harmful" to the inter-German negotiations about the future of GDR prisoners.

It has been shown that discretion is likely to be of greater use than the making of noise. Thus the Inner-German Ministry points to political prisoners whose names were struck off the list by East Berlin after West German media had dealt with their case. Egon Franke: "These efforts must not be the subject of public discussions. Whoever thinks he can have a free rein here is on the wrong track. Too many risks are involved."

Bonn's representative in East Berlin, Guenter Gaus, had stated on Western television as early as 14 December that "everyone here" had to realize "that any public treatment of individual cases virtually destroys the chances of a positive settlement of these individual cases."

The concern also applies to those people for whose move the people in Bonn make an effort whenever they have ransomed political prisoners--the members of their families. Whether the CDU/CSU firebrands will also be amenable to reason will be apparent soon: between the parties in parliament a compromise proposal is under discussion to transfer the committee hearing of former prisoners to a session closed to the public.

As yet the CDU's Jaeger is making noises about the planned hearing really having "nothing to do with the ransoming of prisoners." If nevertheless

a witness should want to say something about it, the committee chairman could block him after all.

Jaeger is not afraid of consequences as far as the "special efforts" are concerned, saying, "that is connected with the GDR's hunger for foreign currency."

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CSO: 3103

COAL, POWER PLANT SUBSIDIES CRITICIZED

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 17 Mar 80 pp 53-57

[Report: "Paying Three Times Over"]

[Text] The power industry, coal mining and the federal government are negotiating a new electricity law which increases the burden on the consumer and taxpayer.

For more than 10 years, farmers have caught up with the rest as far as their income is concerned, but they are being subsidized as if they were still living an impoverished life.

For more than 20 years, there has been no lack of savings capital in the Federal Republic, with Germans proving to be amazingly constant systematic savers, but holders of savings books continue to be subsidized as if, as after the world war, it were still necessary to boost the will to save with government assistance.

Subsidies, experience shows, outlast the reasons for which they were created.

This is also the solid experience now being gathered in downright model fashion by the managers of hard coal mining and the power industry. Five years ago Bonn passed the so-called coal pfennig to the energy industry. The surcharge collected from electricity consumers (at present about 4.5 percent of electricity bills) goes into the accounts of the power plant people to make it easier for them to use domestic coal.

For the benefit of coal, up to DM 2,400 million a year have thus been flowing to the power plants. In accordance with the wish of the government, this is to offset the "additional cost of using hard coal for the production of power as compared with the use of heavy fuel oil."

The additional costs have long since ceased to exist, but the subsidies are to be maintained.

The "substantial cost disadvantages" of German coal which the power production law was intended to remedy in fact have turned into the exact opposite: the onetime "cost-ineffective hard coal" today is less expensive than heavy oil, which has constantly risen in price.

According to the wording of the law, elimination of the subsidy is overdue. When there are "substantial changes in the energy market," stated the legislation in 1977, the federal government should reduce the subsidies or eliminate them altogether without recourse to parliament.

But this is the very thing the coal-consuming power plant people want to avoid. They would rather have a law amending the old law. And because fuel oil is no longer a suitable standard, they have now selected imported coal as the criterion. This stands to reason, for it costs only half as much as the black gold from the Ruhr and Saar.

As it is, the coal pfenning is not by any means the sole public assistance for the domestic fuel. "A system of subsidies that can be sized up only by a few experts" now supports the price of coal, the former head of power supplier Preussenelektra, Erhard Keltsch, complains. With an annual turnover of not quite DM 15 billion, hard coal mining costs the FRG citizen DM 12 billion. Each turnover mark is subsidized with 80 pfennigs.

To the extent that these government subsidies serve the purpose of keeping the by far most important domestic reserve of energy ready for delivery, they do make sense. But meanwhile the coal pfennig has come to exercise no influence whatever on how much coal is poured into the furnaces of the power plants.

The fact is that ever since environmentalists and the courts have spoiled the power producers' expansive nuclear plans, these have had no choice but to use hard coal. Imported coal is blocked by law, the building of oil or gas power plants is prohibited, and the power plants have long since pledged on their own to use 33 million tons of coal annually for producing power until 1987.

Ruhr coal chief Karlheinz Bund is already planning beyond that date. In the amending of the power production law, he is obtaining "reliable" guarantees that the power plants will raise their purchases to 50 million tons a year until 1995.

The power producers want to have their efforts sweetened by further refinements of the subsidy system. Thus they will be reimbursed in the future for the flue gas desulfurization which they are legally bound to undertake.

Just as silly as the fact that the power plant people in the future are to be paid by the government for the transfer of power the same amount as it would have cost to send the corresponding quantity of coal by rail or ship.

The citizen will have to pay three times over. The example of the coal power plant of Bexbach/Saar planned jointly by Badenwerk [Baden Works], Energie-Versorgung Schwaben [Swabian Energy Supply] and Bayernwerk [Bavarian Works] illustrates the economic nonsense:

--For the 750-megawatt contingent in the Saarland, the builders for a start will get tax free a lost subsidy of DM 135 million;

--In order to transport the power produced at the wrong location into the south German supply area right through the Pfaelzer Wald nature forest, the government will come up with the excess costs compared with shipping coal;

--whatever the railway thus loses in the way of freight income will have to be replaced by correspondingly higher federal government subsidies to the railway.

What's the use? Far removed from the public eye, which long since has ceased to be able to look through the subsidy thicket, the coal and power lobbies, with the kind assistance of Bonn officials, to a large extent have already agreed on a new power production law.

For the time being none of those concerned wants to talk much about the state of the negotiations. Ministerialdirigent Bernhard Brauback, the official responsible for coal in the Federal Ministry of Economics, knows why: "If anything, it might disturb things."

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CSO: 3103

GENERAL POEPPPEL ON IMPROVING TRAINING OF NONCOMS

Bonn DIE WELT in German 14 Mar 80 p 2

[Interview with Army Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen Hans Poeppel Wolfram
Von Raven: "Not Looking for Small-Time Managers, But for Non-Coms With a
Heart"]

[Text] Bonn—Lieutenant General Hans Poeppel, 58, has been Army Chief of Staff since 1 April 1979. As commanding officer of the 1st Motorized Infantry Brigade and the 6th Motorized Infantry Division for many years, Poeppel has had a great deal of experience with the rank and file soldier.

WELT: Non-commissioned officer training is to be improved and therefore to be extended from 12 to 15 months.

Poeppel: This reform is important for the Air Force and the Navy no doubt; but for the Army it was imperative— for quantitative but above all for qualitative reasons. The greatest number of draftees, namely 176,000, serve in the Army. There must be optimal utilization of their short term of service. Whether and how this is done depends on the caliber of the instructors, which is to say the non-commissioned officers who are in close contact with the soldiers and who, so to speak, leave their mark upon them. They not only determine the performance of the troops to a large extent, but also their spirit. Year in, year out the Army trains some 24,000 non-commissioned officers. They are not trained as specialists alone, but as instructors, squad leaders and commanders of weapons systems. This is another way of saying that they are not simply "operators" or "foremen." Due to shortages, we have not paid enough attention to our young NCO's so far. They did not undergo a complete training cycle such as the rank and file did. They were given a short, severely curtailed course of instruction which afforded guidance but did not really prepare them for their job. In the line of duty they were often insecure, exhibiting leadership deficiencies which would lead to errors of judgment or to attempts to establish chummy relationships with the ordinary soldiers. This will be changed— for one thing, in order to strengthen the NCOs' authority.

WELT: An army, as the saying goes, is only as good as its noncoms. Do you subscribe to that?

Poeppel: I do, essentially. And the reputation of an army, a psychological factor of some importance after all, depends on the reputation of its noncoms. Draftees returning home from their military service tend to view the time spent as a GI to a large extent in terms of the non-commissioned officers under whom they served. And this has an influence on their attitude toward defending their country. The day-to-day relationship with the men who appeal to them to serve their country may do more to instill a sense of civic pride in them than any theoretic knowledge of our democratic institutions. Yes— it is important to upgrade the non-commissioned officers, particularly in the area of moral leadership. I believe the noncoms have a right to expect to be properly and thoroughly trained for the duties assigned to them.

WELT: What changes are actually planned?

Poeppel: The new training program is characterized by four improvements. 1. To complete the training cycle, the trainee NCO will stay with his squad or crew for nine months instead of previously six. This ought to give him more experience in handling weapons and equipment and develop his understanding for the mentality of a small group. 2. At the end of the 9 months he undergoes the first part of the NCO training course which may last up to 11 weeks. For these courses, the trainees are drawn together in their units to complete their training, to acquire basic knowledge in general areas of instruction and to be familiarized with basic training methods. 3. The second part of the training cycle, also lasting 11 weeks, is devoted to the special requirements of a particular branch of service. The trainee, who has signed up for 2 years of service, is usually promoted to NCO at the end of 15 months and is then still available for 9 more months as a squad leader or tank commander or for some other special assignment. 4. Plans are to provide for a 4-week supplementary training course for NCOs who sign up for more than 2 years. It is to be exclusively devoted to leadership and training methods and is thus designed to increase and deepen the young men's experience. We will start the first part of the NCO training cycle on 1 October of this year. The second part is scheduled for 1 January of next year and the supplementary course will probably begin on 1 April 1961.

WELT: Whether this reform will be a success and whether it will increase the attractiveness of an NCO career will most likely depend not only on the content but on the style of these training courses...?

Poeppel: Without a doubt. I am not looking for machine operators for an apparatus which goes by the name of soldiering, nor for small-time managers, but for NCOs who have a heart and who are sincere. And that is why the training must be based on precepts which obligate the instructors of future instructors and leaders of men to exemplary behavior.

ASSISTANT EDITOR: OF CP LEADERS, SAARINEN HAS RARE GRASP OF REALITY

Helsinki HUFVUDEBLADET in Swedish 29 Feb 80 p 4

[Editorial by Henrik von Bonsdorff]

[Text] Aarne Saarinen has now spoken out: within a year at the very most the Finnish CP must choose between normalization and an open party split. Taisto Sinisalo doesn't really agree with his boss. According to him there is no minority opposition. Henrik von Bonsdorff comments on the situation.

The internal situation in the Communist Party of Finland has now reached a point where a choice must be made between two alternatives: either return to normal activities within the framework of the present statutes or make a definite party split. So said the chairman of the Finnish CP, Aarne Saarinen, in a well-written article almost two whole pages long that was published in KANSAN UUTISET this week.

Saarinen has said things along these lines on several occasions since last fall. But as far as we can recall his earlier statements were not as clear and unmistakable. Now the party has reached a point where at the latest by the time the 19th party congress is held a year from now a decision must be made, a stop must be put to the schism that has been going on for over 10 years so that order can be restored to the ranks. If there are party people who won't bow to a demand for normalization of party life they must take the consequences of their reactions. But they must also assume responsibility for any party split this might cause, the Finnish CP boss wrote.

Aarne Saarinen is undeniably unique among leaders of the communist movement. There are not many of his colleagues who have shown the desire and ability to make a realistic analysis of their own party's position and in particular of their party's weaknesses and then have made the results public in clear and understandable language. In this context it must be noted that like other communist leaders Saarinen makes no effort to

keep his flow of words within reasonable limits. They must rely on an unusual degree of patience and tenacity on the part of their members.

To some extent the latest article by the chairman of the Finnish CP represents variations on old themes. But there are angles of approach in his arguments that arouse our interest. Saarinen traces the party split back to its very beginnings, all the way back to the difference of opinion in the old Social Democratic Party. But in his opinion the acute division of opinion stems from the period after the death of Stalin and the early 1960's. A fear of revisionism and reformism bred in conservative "Stalinist" party members a total distrust of any kind of change. It was safer to stick to the old authorities, to speak in the words of Marx and Engels rather than risk thinking for oneself. They believed in the destruction of capitalism, preached the proletarian development of the working class in the bourgeois society, and so forth.

Indirectly this downgraded the enormous progress made in the status of the working class, Saarinen points out. With the Finnish CP as the most dominant progressive force, of course. The often crass criticism of the Finnish CP leadership for allegedly failing to increase voter support for the party has also been distorted and counter to the interests of the working class. The critics have been blind to the radical changes in the country's population structure in general and the catastrophic reduction of the party's traditional support groups. If one bears these things in mind as well as the new economic and social position of the working class, the enormous swelling in the ranks of civil servants and the protracted internal split within the Finnish CP it is remarkable, according to Saarinen, that the support of the movement has been as stable as it has been.

Instead of fouling their own nest they should be trying to find their own place in modern society. Saarinen warned the Finnish CP against appearing to the outside world as simply a group of discontented and negative people, nagging and bitter critics of current conditions who have played no part in the social progress of recent decades and who stand apart from the rest of society. "When communists say--allegedly backed by Marx--that no matter how large they are wage increases have no effect on inflation, what are other people to believe with regard to Marx and the Finnish CP?" the party leader asks.

Saarinen is walking through a political minefield when he says that concepts of the Finnish CP as an "unpatriotic party," a "representative of foreign powers," a "fifth column" are still quite strong among other population groups. Of course the picture is wrong, but not entirely unfounded, in Saarinen's view. This picture must be changed if the Finnish CP is to increase its support. And the "dogmatists" and the "scholastics" who don't realize that even the founders of socialism were not infallible, especially with regard to predicting the future, ought to be put in mothballs.

Instead the Finnish CP should work solely on the basis of modern social and political realities. This means that for the time being the party should fight for reforms within the framework of the present system--without obscuring the ultimate goal, socialism. The struggle should be waged even in the cabinet. No Western communist party has yet been able to break capitalism by acting as the opposition, Saarinen says. And he reaches the conclusion that this role can be played only by a united and closely-knit party.

One can only wonder why the Finnish CP leader is pursuing his normalization campaign so hard now after a decade of damaging internal schism. It is clear that he has had more than enough of official myths of an undivided party, of party congresses that are hypocritical dress parades for sanctioning false and distorted compromises decided upon in advance by party juntas. And one can't really blame him for thinking it would be the right thing to do to end his term as party leader with a successful offensive at the head of a group of people who are all pulling together.

But why now? Of course we can say--as Saarinen does himself--that there are municipal elections this year. More important than that, Saarinen by his own admission now sees "comrades" in both the disputing camps who are ready to work in a new Central Committee to return party activity to normal channels in accordance with party statutes. Saarinen makes a point of stressing that returning to the statutes is his central demand, which should not be interpreted as a demand for total regimentation, unconditional capitulation.

The question is whether Saarinen is judging the situation correctly. If one reads Taisto Sinisalo's lengthy responses in TIEDONANTAJA the situation does not look very promising. The leader of the Taisto faction fires off formal broadsides against Saarinen who is accused of wanting to change the Finnish CP from a revolutionary to a reformist party. He sent out his adjutant, the paper's editor in chief, with a harsh attack on Saarinen's words concerning the patriotism of the Finnish CP. The party is a "Finnish party," we are told, a patriotic party. Well, all right, but what about TIEDONANTAJA? One has to wonder, especially during the Afghan crisis.

Sinisalo claims that there is no minority wing within the party at all. He castigates party secretary Arvo Aalto for his "historic compromise." He wants to place a gag on the party organ, KANSAN UUTiset, which supposedly no longer serves the interests of the Finnish CP. He talks a lot about solidarity--but only on his terms.

There is a year to go before the next congress. It may demonstrate whether or not Sinisalo's statement is correct when he says that there is no minority within the Finnish CP.

OBJECTIVES OF GISCARDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Paris LE FIGARO in French 27 Feb 80 p 9

[Editorial by Serge Maffert]

[Text] National independence, participation in an alliance and solidarity with European countries, French-speaking African countries, nonaligned countries, and the Third World: these are the three essential elements of French politics, the three key phrases to parallel the famous trilogy: liberty-equality-brotherhood.

In his speech, directed towards the French people rather than political observers, Giscard d'Estaing succeeded in giving a clear, cohesive picture of French diplomatic action. But, at the same time, he launched a very strong counterattack against those in our country who criticize this policy and openly favor alignment with the United States and even, for certain people close to the power structure, desire France's return to NATO.

It is for this reason that the crux of the presidential declarations is the extremely definite reaffirmation of independent policy without which, the president said, France would be nothing more than a superpower's province.

France neither reacts to...nor places herself in relation to..., she conducts her politics in accordance with her own objectives. Giscard d'Estaing outlined these objectives in just a few words: defend our security, maintain peace ("without resigning oneself to the inevitable"), give everyone a chance to be heard, and contribute in the organization of a world which is better adapted and more just.

Above all, while recalling the exact contents of the Atlantic Alliance and reaffirming the sincere respect France has for this Alliance, Giscard d'Estaing made an effort to de-emphasize and demystify the seeming contradiction between conducting an independent political policy and belonging to a defensive military alliance.

He emphasized that this situation was the entire history of France, from its beginnings. In fact, an alliance is also a means of conducting political policy.

The head of state remarked that the easiest thing to do is to align oneself. He could have added: it is also the most comfortable. Our country has always had a number of people, notably in the administrative circles, who have been inclined to enjoy the comfort of aligning oneself with the great power of the moment, for example, Great Britain between the 2 wars, America since 1945.

The unequivocal position of Giscard d'Estaing is thus taken at a very opportune time. The chief of state demonstrated yesterday evening that, without this independent will, French political policy would cease to exist and would at any rate, deprive itself of any means with which it might influence the course of events concerning world peace and thus the security of our country.

In addition, he underlined the fact that France has these political means, some tied to our nation's history and character, others to the international situation that has resulted from the war, and still others to our economic and nuclear capabilities.

Finally, he insisted on the fact that peace depends to a large degree on world diversification, i.e., of the existence of various decision-making and autonomous centers. Two powers have divided the planet, and this is the major danger. Briefly, Giscard d'Estaing said that one should not look at the world in black and white.

In the end, however, what will remain from this speech by the president of the republic is his call to the French people: we are able to act, but are we willing? Does this go without saying? The quality of the speech, its firmness and precision, which helped to remove certain ambiguities, and especially the desire to put himself in the flow of the great political continuum of the Fifth Republic, a domaine reserved for the president, should not remain without public and international effect.

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FRANCO-SOVIET COOPERATION RESULTS REVIEWED

Paris ELECTRONIQUE ACTUALITES in French 22 Feb 80 p 2

[Article: "Balance of Franco-Soviet Cooperation"]

[Text] The mixed Franco-Soviet commission has drawn up the balance of Franco-Soviet cooperation in the fields of science, technology, and economics, states a joint communique published at the end of the 17th session, held from 11 to 17 February, in Moscow.

The "small commission" noted that "cooperation in the fields of economics, industry, and technology continued to develop successfully," emphasizing that trade between 1975 and 1979 had come close to 60 billion francs (plus 9 billion rubles). Thus, the document specifies, "the target of tripling trade between the two countries, set in the course of the Franco-Soviet summit meetings, has been reached."

The document specifies that in 1979 a number of important contracts were signed stipulating French deliveries of equipment to the USSR.

The commission also noted that "successes have been achieved in basic and applied research," as well as "in agriculture, civil aviation and the aerospace industry, chemistry, transportation, and energy."

The communique also states that the parties "have agreed to meet in the near future to consider the eventual drafting of a new long-term program for the intensification of scientific and technical cooperation over the next decade."

As to the future, the commission's assessment is that "in accordance with the guidelines earmarked in the course of the April 1975 summit meeting between Presidents Valery Giscard D'Estaing and Leonid Brezhnev," it will be necessary to maintain the "high rhythm reached through the development of trade and ensure its structural improvements."

Finally, the communique points out that the meeting took place "in a constructive and frank atmosphere," and that the next meeting will be held in France at the beginning of next year.

Let us note that, within the context of this "frankness," the French delegation expressed the reservations of French scientists in the face of the disciplinary measures taken against some Soviet scientists, reservations which, occasionally, are translated into a reticence to cooperate. On the other hand, in the course of the proceedings, the French representative equally deplored the fact that scientific cooperation between the two countries is somewhat unbalanced. French scientists and researchers are admirably welcomed in the USSR on the tourist and gastronomical levels, he pointed out, but the doors of laboratories are harder to open. Cooperation cannot develop or even go on should laboratories rated to be excellent remain closed.

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HUMAN RIGHTS ASPECT OF FOREIGN POLICY DISCUSSED

Paris PROJET in French Jan 80 pp 40-55

[Article by F. Beauchataud, G. Florent, and J. Pelletier: "Several Horizontal Policies"]

[Excerpt] In the area of human rights French policy has its own motivations and its own style. France is condemned through faithfulness to its past to remain the champion of human rights. The president of the republic sees their defense (message on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the universal declaration) as "a continuing and ever current task." It is a matter of "jointly building a safer, more just and more interdependent world." In a world currently divided by ideologies as much as by the difference in levels of development, human rights is not, therefore, an ideology among others which is used against others: it is the only common regulatory idea which can raise the moral standards of relations between people and among nations.

Undeniably Western in origin, the human rights doctrine, in 1948, became universal and must stay that way. To this end it behooves the West not to identify human rights with its own regimes and not to set itself up with respect to other parts of the world, as a morals professor.

It is not pushing the interpretation of the president of the republic too far, let us hope, to say that everything is happening as if he had made four bets:

--First bet: People are capable of liberty, capable of equality and even capable of brotherhood, or, if preferable, solidarity.

--Second bet: Human rights win out in the long run because in general their progress accompies a rise in the standard of living and progress in education, information and culture.

--Third bet: It is by showing that they are very demanding with respect to human rights at home that democracies will obtain, in the long run, a

rise in the level of respect for human rights throughout the world. Which does not clear them to pass themselves off as critics. For that matter, the only thing that allows a dialogue is an attitude consisting of recognition of the fact that we are all more or less guilty.

--Fourth bet, which logically follows the foregoing: Human rights win out when borders are kept open, and lose ground when the latter are closed.

From the last bet comes a very important consequence: to be avoided, come what may, is anything that brings into question the free passage of persons and the free exchange of material and immaterial goods (above all information): a cold war atmosphere, boycotts, retaliations and reprisals.

If such are actually the president's thoughts, it would be entirely advantageous to make them known during a conference, in a speech or in an interview, for they would be suitable for explaining to the numerous French people who are wondering about it the reasons for certain instances of reticence and abstention by France. Such an occasion could be provided by the ceremony for awarding the Nansen Prize for refugees which the president of the republic will receive in Geneva in the month of December 1979.

The announcement of a draft bill inspired by "Habeas Corpus" (letter which the president of the republic addressed to the prime minister on 25 April, 1979) shows that the chief of state has made up his mind that a French speech on human rights should not be limited to use abroad. A shadow lingers on, however: the question of finding out if the coherence of French policy in human rights matters will be extended to the regime which our country will keep in reserve for the near future regarding immigrant workers. Any weakness of the French Government in this field about which the countries of the Third World are very sensitive would have the effect of damaging the credibility of any initiative which this government might be led to take in an international setting.

ANALYSIS OF GISCARDIAN STYLE IN EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY

Paris PROJET in French Jan 80 pp 25-39

[Article by Pascal Frontaine, lecturer at the Paris Institute of Political Studies and the Polytechnical School, November 1979: "V. Giscard d'Estaing and the Building of Europe"]

[Excerpt] French foreign policy is the "restricted area" of the President of the Republic. V. Giscard d'Estaing has chosen the federal way for the building of Europe, with a double condition attached: A leading position for France in Europe, the impulse being provided by the Franco-German agreement. And, should he accept the direct election of a European assembly, he would promote a European Council within which the heads of state will meet periodically.

Manifestation of the Giscardian Doctrine

The Giscardian concept of the "building" or "organization" of Europe borrows the federation approach and formulates two conditions: On the one hand, a leading position for France in Europe, and, on the other hand, impetus provided by the Franco-German Agreement.

Federation Through the European Council

As he himself recalls,¹ VGE [Valery Giscard d'Estaing] had suggested, as early as January 1967, to "set as a target the gradual creation of a European conference." Whereas in May 1974 he wished "the achievement of a European political union in 1980, following the wish publicly expressed by President Pompidou,"² this horizon, unquestionably too close to be reached, subsequently yields in the Giscardian approach, to the topic of a European federation.

The objective of a federation would come close to *l'œuvre* de Gaulle³ and Pompidou's doctrine should it mean the rejection of any supranationality in the mechanisms of community decisions and would constitute a juridical

obstacle to any development toward a federation. Yet, as conceived by Giscard, the federal theme would represent an institutional progress in terms of a Europe of states, as conceived by General de Gaulle, or a Europe of realities, as conceived by Georges Pompidou, within which the nation states would be the only legitimate and sovereign entities.

The definition provided by VGE to the European Federation remained imprecise for a long time. However, the frequency with which he alluded to this objective was aimed as much at letting it be known that there exists a "grand Giscardian plan" for Europe as to accustom the partners of the EEC who were a priori suspicious of the Gaullist concept. Three texts explain the spirit and outlines of the federation:

- "Why a federation? Because it is necessary both to unify our economies and bring our politics closer and, at the same time, preserve the vigorous and old personalities of our countries. Such a federation would have no precedent, neither in terms of the size of the states, to be brought closer to each other nor the diversity of their nature."⁵

- "A federation is a structure within which the states retain their powers but decide to have joint policies and, progressively, apply them to a certain number of areas. Within a federal structure, however, no one imposes his will on others."⁶

- "The European Federation would have an original structure consisting of three branches: the executive, based on the European Council; the administrative, dealing with community matters, coming from the commission; and a deliberative and legislative branch for community questions, stemming from the assembly. The three branches would be necessarily separate: The separation of powers is a necessary⁷ feature of a federal organization which retains its state structures."

The Giscardian Federation is distinct from the Gaullist Federation in that it does not request community mechanisms tinted with supra-nationality as found in the treaties. It does not reintroduce the simple inter-governmental cooperation within existing communities but would replace them by an executive branch consisting of the heads of governments which will express the political will and would be able to act in areas not covered by the treaties (diplomacy, security, etc.).

Inexplicable and inapplicable before the creation of the European Council, the federal approach has assumed an entirely new meaning ever since, starting with 10 December 1974, the nine chiefs of state and of government decided to meet at least three times a year to discuss and pass decisions on European questions. The idea of regular meetings among the highest officials of the community had been making its way for several months.⁸ However, the birth of the European Council is claimed by VGE to be the result of his personal initiative and success

in the field of European policy. Subsequently, clarifying this, he admitted that "it was more important for the French concept of Europe to adopt and, at this point, set up this European Council rather than continue to differ or to postpone elections for the European Parliament." As a matter of fact, it has been believed by some that in 1974, together with its partners, France exchanged the creation of a European Council, as it wanted it, for an agreement on the principle of a universal suffrage election which had always been opposed by de Gaulle and Pompidou. Yet, even before his own election, VGE had abandoned the veto of the principle regarding the election of European members of parliament, planning "to organize, at the proper time, their election through universal suffrage, as stipulated in the treaties.¹⁰ On the other hand, it is logical to strengthen the European executive branch at the time when the parliament and the democratic control institution would increase its authority through universal suffrage.

With an elected parliament, the European Council and the institutions based on the treaties are the proper elements of a developing federal body. Yet, if these three points of the system are consistent with the distinct functions, failure to emphasize the importance, if not the preference, given to the European Council would be the equivalent of betraying the Giscardian thinking. The European Council is "a necessary agency for coordination and impetus which provides the unity of the body consisting of the economic community and the functioning of political cooperation (. . . .). It must insure the dynamism of the entity by resolving essential problems, establishing guidelines, and, whenever necessary, letting the voice of Europe be heard."¹¹

This concentrates the highest manifestation of the executive power of the community and allows the close regular and frank discussion among the European political leaders. The views of the major countries, as expressed by the highest leaders, is thus particularly listened to, and the principle of decision by unanimous vote is accepted; for such reasons the European Council is, in VGE's views, both the motor which will lead the European countries along the federal way and the major institution on which the completed building will be erected.

The Conditions of a Federal Europe

A federal Europe should bring together countries which retain their personalities; France would occupy a distinct position and its task, its capabilities, and its ambitions should put it in the first rank. The President of the Republic does not hesitate to pull the national string. The theme of France leading the European organization parallels and justifies the organization of a kind of Europe which favors French interests and within which such interests would be vigorously defended.

In this period of Giscardian thinking, electoral concerns seem more important compared with the classical pedagogy of the chief of state

and, even more so, than the community philosophy: "We, the French, lack the talent of being stragglers. The French genius takes France to the head of the defenders of new and generous ideas (. . .).¹² It is the interest of France to lead the organization of Europe."

One would not even dare to imagine what the reactions of the French political parties would be had the name France been replaced by the name Germany, and had this speech been made by a German leader. Yet, one understands that the purpose of this tonality is to exorcise the old anti-German background lumbering within every Frenchman, a background which some would like to awaken. VGE would like to convince the French that the inferiority complex they feel toward their neighbors across the Rhine could be eliminated if by 1985 our country would become an economic power comparable to the FRG. France would have no reservations in playing the game of building Europe if its partners consider it strong: "The existence of a clearly distinct economic power would not be good for Europe. The nature of the federal system we are considering is to base our relations on a regime of partners which supposes a certain equality of means. The symmetric complement of my support of the organization of a European federation is found in the emphasis of French economic development."¹³

As a corollary to this basic request, Europe appears also as a zone of economic stability which would favor a stimulating competition among its partners: "The development of the economic situation in France should be comparable to those of the neighboring countries; in particular, the rate of price increases, level of economic activities, and competitiveness of our goods and enterprises must be comparable to those of our partners."¹⁴

The second condition for the organization of a federal Europe equally concerns Franco-German relations. However, its nature is political. Whether by accident or necessity, the personal relations which developed between VGE and Helmut Schmidt, relations established when both were members of the Council of the Ministers of Economics of the EEC, at the beginning of the 1970's remain excellent. Anxious to replace the traditional Franco-German dialogue with a tripartite dialogue, President Pompidou was maintaining with Edward Heath relations which were at least as regular as they were with Willy Brandt. When he was succeeded by VGE the other two heads of the triangle changed as well. However, the new British prime minister, Harold Wilson, did not become part of the Giscard-Schmidt dialogue. Resuming, therefore, the policy of the Franco-German axis established by Robert Schuman and Adenauer, and brilliantly followed by de Gaulle, VGE emphasized that "a Franco-German understanding always appears like the cornerstone of Europe."¹⁵ The reconciliation between the two countries marked the starting point for the building of Europe and the joint action by the two biggest EEC powers appears, more than ever, to be the motor which could lead weaker or smaller partners.

"Ever since its beginning, the purpose of Franco-German cooperation has been to serve a cause bigger than itself: to unify Europe to give it back, together with control of its destiny, its former radiance and the ability to effectively contribute to the solution of the major problems facing the contemporary world."¹⁶

The semiannual summit meetings organized within the framework of the Franco-German 22 January 1963 Treaty, numerous telephone conversations, and bilateral talks during some international meetings represent that many occasions for the French President and the German Chancellor to pursue, face to face, the dialogue they are engaged in within the community framework. This practice, which is a source of progress for the building of Europe, should be careful to avoid two reefs: our partners are showing ever growing suspicion at what seems to be the beginning of a community directory. Mrs Thatcher's diplomatic assaults seem to indicate that Great Britain is trying to emphasize its rights as a great power within the EEC. On the other hand, the Franco-German axis must be able to survive the change of governments in both countries: It would be hazardous to make the destinies of the community dependent on the affinity between two individuals.

The Action

It would be difficult to separate in the study of France's European policy, as of 1974, what has been the work and collective responsibility of the government and what is specifically the result of the activities of the President of the Republic. It is the president who provides the major impulse to his country's diplomacy and develops an atmosphere which, day after day, outlines the features and the style of his community policy. The practice noticed since 1958 and emphasized starting with VGE's presidency excludes any classification which would separate the "current affairs" dealt with by the ministerial services (Quai d'Orsay, SGCI, Permanent Mission), and the Elysee "private grounds." The President of the Republic and his advisors study all the files which draw their attention and have the right to retain the upper hand from conception to implementation. Thus, in France, the European monetary system is the product of the close cooperation between the Presidency of the Republic and the governor of the Banque de France. The appointment of Jean Francois-Poncet, former secretary general at the Elysee Palace as minister of foreign affairs proves that the closest assistant to the president is closely associated with the conduct of his foreign policy.

Here we shall limit the inventory of the European activities carried by VGE to the facts which obviously denote the imprint of the president or facts to which he has drawn particular attention in his statements.

From One Presidency to Another

Elected on 19 May 1974, VGE immediately acquired the opportunity to practice his European concept, since, from June to September 1974 France became the president, for the balance of the semiannual period, of the EEC Council. Four years later, the presidency returned to Paris, from January to June 1979. Within that five-year period three distinct epochs could be singled out: rehabilitation, waiting, and restarting. Rehabilitation did not mean that France had to regain any lost honor. However, in the course of the second half of 1974, VGE tried to change the atmosphere of Franco-European and Franco-American relations. The 1973 events had raised the tension between France and its partners. The 15 December 1973 Copenhagen Summit had brought to light the divisions and egotism of the Europeans in the face of the petroleum crisis. The verbal jousts between Michel Jobert and Henry Kissinger or between Jobert and his European colleagues ("Good morning, traitors!") punctuated a climate dominated by suspicion and rancor.

The new president, elected under the "liberal and European" label, was faced with removing the debt hanging over French diplomacy: Since the heroic times of Gaullism it had seemed to some of our partners as being a go-it-alone cloudy diplomacy.

On 27 August 1974 VGE announced to the press the initiative in the areas of economic and monetary union and in terms of a political union. The 10 December Paris Summit concretized all the openings made by France. VGE withdrew the opposition of his two predecessors to the application of Article 138 of the EEC Treaty which called for elections, based on universal suffrage, of the members of the European Assembly. In the same spirit, the French president accepted a more flexible use of the veto within the EEC Council, thus breaching the code of laws drafted in Luxembourg, in January 1966, by Maurice Couve de Murville at the end of the 30 June 1965 institutional crisis. It was agreed "to abandon the practice of subordinating the decision of any matter to the unanimous consent of the member countries."

Finally, France accepted the previously criticized plan of the creation of a European foundation for regional development (FEDER), basically conceived for the benefit of Great Britain and Italy.

The conversion of the summit meetings into a European Council, submitted by VGE as a means for moving the European union ahead, completed the positive picture of the community as outlined by the Nine at the end of 1974. The conclusion of the Lome 28 February 1975 agreements, setting up, on a new base, relations between the EEC and the associated countries of Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific, and the official inauguration of the FEDER, on 7 March, marked, for the time being, the end of the period of community accomplishments.

A wait-and-see attitude characterized the second half of 1975 and the two following years.

Gradually realizing that the economic crisis of the West would be lengthy, the governments within the community displayed isolationist trends. The progress of the economic and monetary union was blocked by Chancellor Schmidt who demanded that any expansion of the monetary area, reduced to the mark zone, be based, in advance, on the success of the economic improvement efforts launched by his partners in the crisis. In 1976, the Council of Europe, meeting in Luxembourg in April, in Brussels in July, and in The Hague in November, were merely able to note the existence of an economic recession, increased unemployment, and a disturbance in the balance of payments which affected the great majority of EEC members. In this climate of crisis, and while the franc which had become part of this monetary fluctuation in May 1975, was forced to abandon it in March 1976, it seemed essential to VGE to preserve the community gains by seeing specifically that the flow of French agricultural and industrial exports within the EEC would not decline.

Entrusting to a former vice president of the commission the position of prime minister, the president proved the importance he ascribed to the former's European experience. Actually, Barre remains in the eyes of his European partners the symbol of a firm and vigorous attitude quite beneficial to the strength of the franc on the monetary market.

The upsurge started as of the spring of 1978 and developed in the course of the new French presidency of the EEC, from January to June 1979. The President of the Republic paid particular attention to five areas of community activities and made it possible for France to find itself at the tip of the progress achieved in the building of Europe during that time.

1. The decision concerning a European monetary system was refined in the course of the Copenhagen, Bremen and Brussels European Councils (April, July, and December 1978). The Franco-German Agreement played a major role in the pursuit of a project revealing a major change of the minds: Faced with the crisis, European solidarity and joint action become preferable to the superimposition of national actions conducted separately in the hope of a hypothetical convergence.

2. The protection of French farming interests achieved by improving the agro-financial context, VGE issued his ministers the assignment of linking the establishment of the SME [European Monetary System] with an agreement on the elimination of monetary compensation funds (MCM) which partitioned European agriculture. Therefore, at France's request, the implementation of the SME was postponed from 18 December 1978 to 13 March 1979, at which date the Nine adopted a schedule for the dismantling of existing MCM and a mechanism for the elimination of future MCM.

3. The French president solemnly offered his support to the EEC membership requests filed by Greece, Spain, and Portugal. The possibility for such an expansion provided VGE with the opportunity to describe the final political and democratic aspects of the European structure. Becoming more than a simple economic agreement among several countries, it is a historical design: "The basic question which we must ask ourselves is the following: Should we seek an agreement restricted to a few countries? On the contrary, should we organize Europe within the boundaries of its civilization and history? Even if this might be more difficult, I believe that this should be our task."¹⁸ In order to glamorize his position, the French president visited Madrid in June 1978 and Lisbon in July 1978, and attended the conclusion of Greece's Acceptance Treaty, in Athens, on 28 May 1979, while the PCF and the RPR [Rally for the Republic] showed their hostility to this expansion and, particularly, to the joining of Spain. The arguments presented by the President of the Republic were political, yet lined by economic considerations. It was fully in France's interest to favor the rebalancing of the community of which France would become the central part, the mandatory crossing point from the Iberian Peninsula and Northern Europe. French influence and language would be strengthened by a process which would also stabilize countries which have recently come to democracy and are still frail. Finally, concerned with not sacrificing the interests of the south of France, VGE undertakes to promote with his partners the organization of big markets for Mediterranean products and to see to it that all such participation treaties stipulate proper guarantees and periods of transition.

4. The firmness displayed by the French president in honoring his 1974 pledge concerning the direct election of a European parliament was to the benefit of the European idea, on the level of French public opinion. Faced with the open opposition of the PCF and the RPR, VGE did not hesitate to demand of the prime minister to involve the responsibility of his cabinet for the adoption of the 20 September 1976 Act by the National Assembly, on 14 June 1977. In order to provide a certain assurance to those in the majority who fear the granting of excessive power to the elected European Assembly, the president submitted to the Constitutional Council the question of the constitutionality of the project and obtained its favorable opinion on 30 December 1976.

While stating that "as long as federal Europe has not been organized and proved its viability I will not favor a broadening of the power of the European Parliamentary Assembly,"²⁰ VGE showed his interest in the future of the European institution by supporting the election of Simone Veil to the presidency of the European Parliament, in Strasbourg, on 17 July 1979.

5. Finally, Giscardian diplomacy deserves the credit for the success of the efforts made in the field of energy by the members of the community in adopting a joint attitude in the face of the rising petroleum prices and threats of scarcity. The decision made by the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, on 22 June 1979, of limiting petroleum imports made it possible for the Europeans to show a united front when facing their Western summit partners in Tokyo and encourage the United States to follow their example.

Complete and Undertake

Do these five years cover most of VGE's ambitions covering Europe at the beginning of his seven-year term, or else are they the beginning of a broader design? The building of the community is a continuing creation and it would be worthless to determine its final point as of now. The Giscardian method would be progressive rather than precipitate development, and the increase of specific ties of solidarity rather than involvement in premature projects.

No one doubts that the view which VGE has on the development of the world leads him to firmly include France's destiny within that of organized Europe capable of addressing others with a single voice and collectively defending national interests, most of which are identical. However, there are those who are impatient with the slowness or caution with which VGE is proceeding to this organization. They are concerned by the state of dependence to which Europe would be condemned unless it acquires, before it is too late, the necessary means to answer the energy challenge, the totalitarian menace, and the commercial and monetary disorder.

Should one not go faster and farther in the development of a European currency and of a regional policy engaged in a real financial redistribution, of an energy policy with means adequate to the necessary adaptation requirements? When will France lead its partners into giving a community social policy a sufficiently specific content to restore to those affected by unemployment, from Naples to Dublin, and from Brest to Charleroi, the feeling that they belong to a united European society? What initiatives does the French government plan on taking so that a joint industrial policy, both in the areas of declining activities and of promising technologies, could gradually replace the difficult and scattered changes undertaken by the national industries?

The European idea may be reduced to a single principle: The European states would be more successful in accomplishing together that which they can no longer accomplish separately. A long time will have to pass before they acquire their decision-making and action-taking instruments which could handle such policies.

Would the President of the Republic be satisfied with a federation which does not assume the two essential functions to the life of an independent political entity: currency and defense?

Whereas the SME marks the beginning of a broader system which will give Europe a monetary personality, it does not lead to the establishment of a center for economic decisions which would be needed by the community to coordinate the budgetary and fiscal policies of the member countries. "Future Europe must be a Europe totally integrated from the economic viewpoint, with its consequences, i.e., it should be equally socially integrated and have a monetary extension,"²¹ VGE stated as early as 1976.

However, unquestionably, it is in the area of European defense that the implementation possibilities will remain blocked the longest by the burden of the past. France's official doctrine is that of an independent defense based on the nuclear deterrent aimed at protecting the national sanctuary.

This Gaullist heritage, fiercely protected by the bulk of the RPR deputies, themselves supported by the left wing of the Socialist Party and by the communists, recently converted to the nuclear religion, weighs heavily in the French political climate.

The President of the Republic has rarely spoken on the possibility of a European defense organization. The polemic which developed in the summer of 1979, following the European elections, as to an eventual Franco-German cooperation on military nuclear matters and, more generally, on European defense, seems like a violation of a taboo. The subtle form of "quiet Finlandization," applied to the western Europeans under the cover of detente is multiplied by the results of the enthrone-ment of national sovereignty and the traumatic experience of the failure of the 1954 European Defense Community, thus rendering explosive any debate on European security.

The concept of the President of the Republic is based on a clear political continuity. However, it opens the way to change justified by strategic imperatives.

According to political continuity the building of Europe does not affect problems of defense to which the treaties do not allude and which remain within the limits of strictly national competence. Withdrawing from the NATO integrated military organization in 1966, and developing a totally independent nuclear deterrent force, France could protect its vital interests and play a global role to the extent of its own ambitions. This political principle is doubled by a historical analysis. Asked about the eventual establishment of a European defense, in 1975 the French president answered that we must distinguish between two successive periods: "There will be an initial time spent in the

search for a European political independence; subsequently, there may be a second period for the search of a certain defense function. . . . To imagine that these two items could be treated on the basis of the same chronological order and, furthermore, to consider the subject of defense before dealing with the subject of a policy of independence is a fundamental diagnostic error."²²

VGE thus puts the political organization of Europe ahead of European defense: "Once this organization has been tested through a certain number of difficulties and situations, at that time, it could raise the question of knowing how to conceive of and organize European defense."²³

Diplomatic considerations must be added to this possible opportunity: A plan for European defense would be incompatible with the preference shown by some of our partners for a defense system integrated with that of the United States. On the other hand, it would trigger "inexplicable fears" on the part of the Soviet Union which would see in the modification of the status quo a certain military threat to itself.

In the margin of this classical approach, the symptoms of a more European oriented development may be seen in the formulation of the French strategic doctrine. The questioning of the French defense concept changed in 1976 is considered by some as a real turn. The military program law for 1977-1982, passed on 16 June 1976, its submission to the parliament, and the statements by General Mery, chief of general staff of the armed forces, of March 1976, and of the President of the Republic, of 1 June 1976²⁴ explicitly place the defense of France within the European framework.

The illusion of the "nuclear all or nothing" and the doctrine of "all azimuths" were denounced. This suggests that the threat comes from the forces of the Warsaw Pact, and, in order to answer it, France should be able to develop a number of military means, ranging from conventional forces to a strategic force, going through tactical nuclear weapons. The concept of the "expanded sanctuary," formulated by General Mery, means that France should be able to participate in the "advance line battle" side by side with the forces of our European partners.

The conceptual breakthrough of the spring of 1976, showing the influence of the President of the Republic, consisted essentially of recalling a basic fact related to the interpretation given to the Gaullist dogma by some of General de Gaulle's successors: France's security lies within the European framework and cannot be conceived outside of its alliances, and will become involved in the first confrontation which could take place on FRG territory. Recalling that "participating in the defense of Europe is one of the essential missions of the French armed forces,"²⁵ Yvon Bourges, minister of defense, provides an illustration of the Giscardian concept of European solidarity, evident on the strategic

level, and opposed to the myth of France alone being able to maintain its independence within a conquered or devastated Europe.

Does VGE think of going further along the way of European cooperation in matters of defense? The awareness that Europe, facing the first strike capacity of the Soviet SS 20 is as vulnerable as the rest of Europe, and the identical situation in which the Europeans find themselves in the face of the SALT III negotiations, and the same concern in the face of the uncertainties of the American involvement in Europe, should contribute to making France's positions converge with those of its partners. The technological and financial imperatives related to the desire to develop, on a parallel basis, the means for a nuclear deterrent and of a conventional military machinery may urge France to seek more actively the technical and industrial cooperation of its European neighbors.

In order to convert from the assertion of European solidarity to the specific development of a coordinated organization in matters of security, the European governments should go beyond their timid political cooperation, which is based more on an aleatory diplomatic coordination than on a real joint foreign policy. Could it be that a refusal to engage in any discussion concerning the joint aspects of European security deprive of all potential substance the political organization which VGE desires? In other words, should the question of defense not become included in the current political cooperation?

The President of the Republic has two more years and, above all, the possibility of an eventual second seven-year term, to complete the economic, social, political, and strategic targets of a European federation, whose outlines he has traced. Once again France could be called upon to play a role in the destiny of Europe which no one of its partners could or would like to assume.

In conclusion, should we dare wish that VGE might add to his ambition of being a President of the Republic worthy of France, the ambition of becoming the first president of a united Europe?

FOOTNOTES

1. Letter to Leprince Ringuet, president of the French Organization for the European Movement, dated 2 May 1974.
2. Ibid.
3. See 5 September and 31 December 1960 press conferences.
4. 2 July 1970 Declaration.

5. 30 June 1977 televised declaration.
6. Questions asked on French Television 1 on 16 October 1978.
7. Interview with DER SPIEGEL, 1 January 1979.
8. See the study mentioned in note 3.
9. "Straight from the Elysee Palace," 18 April 1979.
10. 2 May 1974 letter cited in note 5.
11. 28 January 1977 Strasbourg speech.
12. 15 May 1979 Hoerdt speech.
13. Interview with DER SPIEGEL, 1 January 1979.
14. French Television 1, 5 December 1978.
15. 6 February 1978 address at the Elysee Palace in honor of Chancellor Schmidt.
16. Address on the occasion of the presentation of credentials by the FRG ambassador on 25 August 1976.
17. Item 1 of the 10 December 1971 summit final communique.
18. Interview with LE MONDE, 13 July 1978.
19. Forum at Villeneuve sur Lot, 4 May 1979.
20. 21 November 1978 press conference.
21. 24 June 1976 press conference at the Europa Hotel, in London.
22. 21 May 1975 interview with LE FIGARO.
23. 12 November 1975 interview on Antenne 2.
24. These statements were made by General Mery and the President of the Republic at the Institute of Superior Studies of National Defense.
25. 27 August 1979 statement by Mr M. Bourges made in Avignon at the 32nd Congress of the Interallied Federation of Reserve Officers.

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REVIEW OF FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES IN AFRICA

Nature of French Interests

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[Article by Henri Raison, 1 December 1979]

[Text] French policy in Africa south of the Sahara triggers reservations and even criticism. After an account of governmental activities, following are several questions which shed light on another aspect of the situation.

The African continent is one of the theaters in which the active presence of France has long gained international recognition. The very relative renovation of the French political personnel in charge of this sector, symbolized by the end to the rule by Jacques Foccart at the Secretariat General of the Elysee Palace, has not weakened the action in this area in the least. It seems to have become even stronger in military interventions: Mauritania, Chad, Shaba and, recently, Central Africa; this is something that unrepentant detractors have nicknamed "Jaguar diplomacy," and which, in its way, illustrates the substantial increase in allocations for military cooperation as approved with the last budget.

Naturally, it is doubtful that no one, south of the Sahara, objects to an action in which French political opposition would have the monopoly of criticism. However, this intervention, however controversial it might be, could be resented as being an extreme case. The young African states, aware of their political frailty--starting with their borders--see their continent, once forgotten in the division among the great powers, becoming once again, for economic, strategic, and ideological reasons, a battlefield for influence which seems to be turning to the advantage of the socialist camp. In this case they could seek protectors which, in the long term, would be less dangerous than the real great powers. France is one of them. It is a familiar factor, along with its faults, and it knows us better than the others: These are the privileged links of the colonial heritage. This is tacitly supported by the United States which is hardly willing to involve itself in Africa

for stakes it considers secondary. To this extent, without raising too many objections, France could claim to be the only Western power which is currently offering protection to "threatened" Africans. However, will France pursue in that continent a coherent and consistent policy?

Is There a French African Policy?

To begin with, is French action in Africa unified, proceeding, as it were, from different directions? Without mentioning the various intelligence services, in which "naturalized" individuals, such as Gourvennec in Chad play an important and controversial role, institutionally, there has been a division of areas of influence between the Ministry of Cooperation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The former deals with the former colonial empire plus a few added pieces; the latter is in charge of the remainder. This distinction, whose existence has been deemed desirable by the interested parties themselves, implies a divergence of viewpoints: One would be more concerned with the stabilization of the French-speaking group while the other would be more inclined to deal with Africa giving priority to "external" foreign viewpoints. The Elysee Palace is the umpire.

The 13 state visits paid by the President of the Republic, since the beginning of his seven-year term, alone revealed the African vocation he felt. In his 27 November 1979 televised talk he emphasized both these differences in appreciation and his role: "When questions were raised the answer was that, Foreign Affairs says that it is not its business. . . Cooperation says that it is not its business but that of the Elysee Palace. I accept this responsibility, considering that, in fact, major French political orientations must be followed. . . . In Africa. . . I assumed risks which few people in my position would have assumed and which anyone around me was unwilling to assume or, occasionally, even to share. . . ."

There are, therefore, splits which, occasionally, conceal both political affinities and diverging interests. It would be legitimate to assume that French actions are based on the rules of a game set in high places. However, one does not find in the official speeches inspired by the study of the advice given by the Prince too many claims of disinterestedness.

In Africa France Defends Its Own Interests As Well. . . .

France has substantial interests in Africa. This is confirmed by the number of Frenchmen there, far exceeding that of the "official" cooperating personnel and their families. In steadily increasing numbers, after independence, according to a recent census made by the consulates, they total about 280,000: 116,000 in North Africa, 75,000 in West Africa, 51,000 in Central Africa, 6,000 in South Africa, and

30,000 in East Africa. Together with traditional centers (Morocco, Algeria, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Gabon, Cameroon, South Africa, Madagascar, and Djibouti) they are expanding in the direction of other French-speaking (Zaire) or English-speaking (Nigeria) countries.

France has a variety of interests in Africa. Let us mention some: raw material supplies (uranium, among others); commodity markets: In French industrial exports Africa plays a far greater role compared with the other developed countries; cultural interests (importance of the French language at a time when the Frenchman becomes "Mr One Percent"); strategic, military, and intelligence interests; finally, and perhaps above all, political and diplomatic interests: Through its African role France becomes a "major great power," with clients whose cause it pleads in the court of its European partners, and whom it joins, forming a group, in international agencies.

French interests are supported by separate, public, semipublic, or private entities. Naturally, we find the big industrial and commercial groups which, over the past decade, have carried out an extensive reorganization of economic circuits in French-speaking Africa under the impulse of financial companies (Paribas and Suez). While strengthening their positions, they tend to look rather toward the outside: less, henceforth, in the direction of South Africa, despite public works and engineering projects underway (too uncertain investments), than toward Nigeria where petroleum extraction is doubled by the presence of Peugeot and Michelin. Yet, outside these separate entities, an important share of French presence is secured by a number of small companies which, they too, benefit from the spillover of French aid, occasionally for doubtful purposes. This mass, even more so than the big groups, exerts a conservative influence on French policy.

This fabric of interests is interconnected, and the French representatives are quite flexible. Recently, the French ambassador to Gabon abandoned his diplomatic career to assume the presidency of a uranium mining company; on the request of Gabon's president, he was replaced by a specialist in intelligence. Beyond such cases, the French presence in Africa, unquestionably, meets a certain logic: It has a strategic and political base with a halo of legitimacy granted the former colonizing and emancipating power. Based on the French-speaking bloc, welded by institutions such as the franc zone, this base could expand in the direction of other French-speaking countries (Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi, Mauritius), and beyond, particularly through the absorption of enclaves (Sierra Leone. . . .). Liberia attended the "family meeting" of the Franco-African Kigali summit. Another recent aspect of the redeployment of the French presence in Africa is the important agreements sealing the rapprochement with Angola. The strong position held by France in this base could influence the initialing of contracts between French companies and other African states such as, for example, the Republic

of South Africa. France is called upon to provide to such commercial agreements which, essentially, involve major operations, as much a political as a financial guarantee.

We, the Africans. . . .

The fact that France may have interests in Africa does not invalidate, in itself, the official purpose of its action: To help the African countries find their own way of development. However, should we emphasize too much the disinterested nature of its behavior, we would risk becoming a caricature, paraphrasing one of Tintin's negative characters: "If, quite regretfully, we were forced to intervene in Africa, it was to defend the Africans themselves."

France's action is based on a study of the situation characterized by the following features:

- The conviction that African policy is largely based on the personal ties between the chiefs of states or governments. We are far removed from the relations between lord and vassal of Gaullist times; Hassan II could say, "Giscard is my buddy," something which Senghor would not have allowed himself to do in the case of Pompidou, his fellow disciple. Hence the existence of ties of sympathy, camaraderie and willingness, not all of whose aspects are positive;

- The certainty that political stability is a necessary condition for the socioeconomic development of the African states. However, respect for the golden rule of the OAU of "no questioning of state boundaries," entails the risk of sliding toward "heavy emphasis on stabilization by supporting the systems in power;"

- In extreme cases, support may go beyond financial or strategic aid and support, and convert into a military operation: Open, in clear cases of timely intervention, as in Shaba or Central Africa; or else slow in showing up, as in Chad. An explanation must be given as to the reason for which this intervention would be compatible with the principle of noninterference in the affairs of a government which would be tricky but not impossible, were we to postulate that the "destabilization" is caused exclusively by external forces and never by internal stresses whose exacerbation could have been aggravated by France in some cases. In such a case the action is presented as a return to an artificially disturbed equilibrium.

The outside culprit is almost identified: Soviet imperialism and its Cuban or East German flunkies. To be sure, the Russians have made a breach on the African scene. After a disastrous beginning, they went back to school--plunging more into books than venturing on the terrain--making a particular study of African religions. They concluded that, for the time being, there is nothing to be expected on the Muslim side;

therefore, it would be better to start with Christianized areas. This partially explains the initially surprising switch of alliances between Ethiopia and Somalia, and does not augur an easy time for the zone under French influence. Yet, the Russians are not in a hurry: They know that they will need a great deal of time to be accepted, and are betting on long-term work, as one may see in the case of the young Congolese sent to Cuba for long-term training. Nor are they disturbed by the prolonged absence of the foreign stay: Unlike the Westerners, they are not interested in the least in an immediate solution of the problems of southern Africa or Eritrea, fearing that those they may protect today may politely pack them off, as it has already happened. . . . Furthermore, their activities respect the legal formalities: They too support the powers that be rather than the liberation movements. The fact that they are progressing faster than planned is due, above all, to the tactical errors made by their opponent. The image presented of the Russians as virtual troublemakers may be very useful for face-saving purposes; its pedagogical effectiveness in terms of the Africans is rather doubtful. In some areas, the Libyan scarecrow would be far more effective. It is not being used for different reasons.

The slogan "Africa for the Africans" may be sung to several tunes. It means that neither the Russians nor the Cubans are Africans. They export their models unsuitable to the African soul and sensitivity. This does not apply to us, the French: Do we not share a long common history in which even events such as decolonization assume their true value through continuity? Are we not adopted Africans? Our intervention remains a family affair. Yet, whereas in the case of a military operation this slogan is interpreted in very broad terms, paradoxically, it assumes a very strict meaning in "ordinary" situations: For example, we let corruption and misappropriation develop involving French companies as well. This is considered noninterference! The virtues of African nationalism are preached to counter said imported models: Aware of the dangers (unleashing of passions) and the limits (vanishing of borders through which both men and goods pass) of such nationalism, we administer the antidote of regional unions which may accept new members, some of them quite influential (Nigeria, in West Africa), even if we have to discharge some ballast (Chad, in our example).

Is There a French African Policy?

"Let us ignore cases of 'sloshering' or clumsiness which, piling up, could occasionally develop into a mess; Chad is the best possible example." In Africa France knows occasionally how to be firm, relying on the study of a very opportunistic subtlety. Nevertheless, does it have a coherent policy? Does it have a policy guided by a clear long-term perception of France's real interests and of the real African stakes, and knowing how to promote immediate French interests? This is a less clear situation.

France's African policy will be judged by the test of time. The vision of the historical "continuum," harmoniously linking the stages of its presence in Africa has its share of the truth; its unilateral nature could make it adverse. Has the nature of decolonizing been really determined? Could it be that the present period is considered too much as a means to extend the old ties, merely through more complex rules of the game? While proclaiming our attachment to the Gaullist heritage, are we not forgetting its breaking-up side, due not only to the deliberately spectacular nature given to the emancipation of the new states for the sake, above all, of preserving continuity? At that time most of the new diplomats and cooperative workers consisted of the old reconverted colonial administrators. Using their knowledge of the terrain and the people, they proved particularly able to maneuver the native elites to whose formation they had extensively contributed. How could they be asked, in addition to all this, to become innovators? Yet, these transitional generations are on their way out, as a result of which, as of now, what French action lacks most is a little bit of imagination and a new look even if only for the sake of discovering a solution or a person.

A second question applies to the substance of the policy of cooperation followed. We are not objecting to holding trumps in the African game, as this is a fact, but of playing them poorly. Unquestionably, the fact that such a policy helps to make and break governments has its debatable side; yet, it is even more reprehensible not to use existing credit to block the worsening of situations. Let us point out, quite reasonably, that in terms of their development the French-speaking countries could be adequately compared to their English or Portuguese-speaking counterparts. Let us not forget the increased number of French people and the fact that the Africanizing of cadres is still to a great extent problematical. A firm innovation in the field of training is necessary and cooperation should not be considered an indefinitely extended provisional matter. Long-term contracts should be concluded. However, they should be for a specific period. Unquestionably, this would be more effective than the policy of a global approach which seems to be more inspired by a concern for economy and, in the final account, in violation of its own principle, appears to give the advantage to the rich countries. It would also be necessary to define more clearly the priority targets and undertake their implementation most extensively. Unquestionably, they should include agricultural production. It is a stunning fact to see that Senegal is aiming at food self-sufficiency not before the year 2000. In terms of tropical agriculture, France has very effective tools. Like the tools used in mine prospecting, they remain quite underutilized. In such development problems France proves to be lacking determination and to be even more cautious than the World Bank. This may not be the way for it to promote its own interests in the best possible manner.

New Developments, Considerations

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(Article by Guy George)

(Text) In this article a high official in charge of French African policy provides its major outlines. This official doctrine will be the topic of a forthcoming parliamentary debate.

As a former African power, France has not stopped considering Africa as one of the essential dimensions of its foreign activities. Therefore, the independence acquired by the territories it ruled has not stopped it in the least from a pursuit of an active policy in the black continent. Starting with General de Gaulle's times, this policy has followed a continuing line toward its targets. Initially, it was a question of achieving the emancipation of Africa and of the African person by promoting, above all, economic development and consolidating the structures of the young and still frail countries. This target was achieved under conditions which frequently proved to be difficult and with results varying according to the country and the people. It is clear, nevertheless, that the line of this effort had been earmarked from the very beginning and that it could be summed up through the key words of independence in the field of freedom and progress in the field of political stability.

This steady interest and target remains evident today and continuity in our African policy has not been broken. Today, like yesterday, the legacy of the past is the main foundation of our presence on the other side of the Mediterranean. Whereas the pursuit of emancipation and decolonization may be considered accomplished ever since Djibouti gained its independence, on 27 June 1977, some other elements, inherited from history, remain singularly alive. This means, above all, the priority retained by our contribution in the economic and social development of the African states. Even though on a recent one, in a period of crisis this support becomes more important and more difficult to re-solve. Despite the problems facing its own economy, specifically in terms of employment and energy supplies, France has not only maintained its overall aid to the Third World but has even further emphasized it through the adoption of important decisions: An increase of about 50 percent of investment credits put at the disposal of the FAC (Aid and Cooperation Fund) (which will reach one billion francs in the 1980 budget if passed by parliament); cancellation of some 630 million francs in public debts owed by countries considered the least favored (nine of which African); increased French contribution to the United Nations Development Fund, the ADB and the FAD (African Development Fund); additional contributions to the Sahel countries, etc.

I would like to discuss, above all, the remarkably strong ties which have been maintained between our country and a large number of African states. Such close and trusting relations cover all fields of activity: commerce and sharing of technology, population flows, and linguistic and cultural exchanges. What makes the privileged nature of such relations even less questioned by any French government is that it represents an inestimable capital on the human level while, at the same time, unquestionably contributing to the international prestige of our country. Naturally, however, it must be consistent with the profound wishes of the Africans and, therefore, requires a steady effort of our entire people, an effort which is made even greater by the fact that the hard world of today is characterized by a general stress, the constant change in factors, and merciless competition. Therefore, nothing would be more dangerous to France than to be satisfied with its gains, believing that it has acquired some kind of restricted domain in Africa, whereas we should tirelessly broaden the range of our action and initiative. In other words, as anywhere else, in African matters he who does not advance falls back. We must maintain our high ambitions while remaining vigilant in order to be able to subject our policy to changes which may turn out to be necessary.

Voluntarist Orientation

It is within this context of contemporary realities that, for the past few years, specifically since 1974, the French leadership has made an effort to take a new look at Africa, thus adding a few new features to an African policy which had remained very traditional for quite some time. This voluntarist orientation taken by France was convincingly emphasized by Jean Francois-Poncet, minister of foreign affairs, who made the following statement to the National Assembly on 3 May 1979:

"Unquestionably, there is no part of the world where French interests and feelings are so deeply involved as Africa. Linked with that continent through all possible historical, geographic, and cultural ties, dependent on it, as it is on Europe, for its prosperity and security, France is pursuing toward it a disinterested and courageous policy."

In terms of the methods used, the desire to make our actions more effective has led to a search for developing more sophisticated means of action.

This was specifically manifested in the very emphatic qualitative changes made in our assistance. In terms of investments, the purpose was to make our contribution essentially catalytic. In terms of personnel, simple substitution which was virtually the only type of cooperation applied immediately following independence, is being replaced, to an ever greater extent by personnel training. Gradually, the group of experts in charge of execution of projects is slowly disappearing,

particularly in the field of education. At the same time, our technical assistance is abandoning the administrative or juridical areas for scientific and highly technological sectors. Special efforts have been made to take better into consideration the specific requirements of each state, in close cooperation with its qualified representatives. The same is taking place on the level of financial participation of the richest countries (a system referred to as "globalizing") which, without raising costs, makes it possible substantially to improve the results of our interventions.

The same efficiency concern has made us more aware of the growing importance of security as a condition for the development of the African states.

It has become clear, in a continent subject to numerous conflicts aggravated by all sorts of external interventions, that the security of the states should be based on a certain number of fundamental principles: First of all, in our view, Africa should not become the target of a competition between alien ideologies but be encompassed by the policy of detente. To use once again the statement made by Jean Francois Ponceet, "Detente can only be global. There could be no two worlds, one in which detente would be the rule and another in which relations based on strength would predominate. This is a particularly valid principle in the case of Africa and the Near East."

On the other hand, African security rests on the principles of inviolability of the borders inherited from colonization (OAU resolution adopted at the 1964 Cairo summit), the independence of political and ideological choice made by each state, and the independence of each state, safe from any interference in its domestic affairs.

Furthermore, simple realism makes us note that, considering the current state of forces present on the African continent, maintaining a certain equilibrium is the only means for providing optimum conditions for stability and progress. If the Africans themselves are to be responsible for their security, any violation of the rules of the game carries the germs of an imbalance which should be balanced through help. As a Malagasy proverb says, poetically yet quite aptly, "Fate is a chameleon standing on top of a tree. All that it takes is for a child to whistle to make it change colors." As it is, France is the only Western power which could offer credible assistance to threatened Africans. In a punctual manner it could intervene through response, as the minister of foreign affairs specified, to the requests of "weak or unarmed countries facing attacks launched or supported from the outside. Such interventions, limited in scope and duration, have never had an object other than making possible peaceful solutions, freely discussed, to put an end to tensions and conflicts." As we know, this dimension of our African policy has been the theme of a number of diplomatic initiatives,

specifically in the course of the Franco-Soviet talks and in recent Franco-African summits, and, locally, it was manifested by our military actions in Mauritania, Chad, and Shaba.

The initial balance of such actions reveals unquestionably positive results. It was largely thanks to our military and diplomatic support that Mauritania was able to preserve its integrity and pull out of the Sahara conflict under conditions which the international community has considered satisfactory. In the same way, our two interventions in Shaba made it possible to restore a threatened security (an inter-African force having replaced us), and strengthen the unity of Zaire. They have also opened the way to a rapprochement with all neighboring countries. In Chad the road to "national reconciliation" remains difficult and blocked by dangerous obstacles by virtue of the extreme divisiveness of the Chadians (11 officially listed political trends...) and the involvement of ambitious neighbors such as the Lybians. Nevertheless, substantial progress has been made.

Africa to the Africans

On the conceptual level, our doctrine was given a new emphasis by the President of the Republic with his statement that we should leave "Africa to the Africans." This means that it is the Africans who must establish the ways of development they intend to follow and that no one has the right to impose upon them external models poorly adapted to the historical, sociological, and cultural realities of their continent. It seems clear, in this respect, that neither classical liberalism nor Marxism could meet such requirements, but that it is the free assertion of oneself which transpires, here and there, in Africa, through the quest for negritude authenticity, national socialism, etc. In this area our attitude is based on the conviction that the African mentality is deeply rooted in nationalism and that purely ideological phenomena remain on the surface.

It seems to me that the most delicate and difficult problem of all, that of the exercise of human rights in Africa, should be dealt with by taking such aspirations most strictly into consideration. Indeed, it would be out of place for the Western countries to wish to impose their traditional concepts upon independent nations by freely interfering in their domestic affairs. Conversely, it seems perfectly legitimate to encourage anything undertaken by the Africans themselves aimed at promoting respect for human rights in their continent. It was because an international commission of African judges had established the gravity of violations of human rights committed by former Emperor Bokassa that the French government answered to the request for help made by representative Central African personalities who had undertaken to get their country in Africa rid of a bloodthirsty tyrant and restore the rights of the Central African people. Furthermore, it seems to me that we

should be concerned with broadening our classical concept of individual rights, inherited from 18th century philosophy, by introducing views particularly strongly felt in our time, such as the rights to development and the need for international cooperation.

It is also for the sake of taking into consideration the African nature of the various countries that, these past few years, we have tried not to limit our friendly relations with partners easier to deal with, such as the moderate countries. Thus, we have maintained close cooperation relations with countries which, like Benin, Congo, Madagascar, or Ethiopia, adopted political options quite remote from ours. We keep trying to develop such relations with countries which, like Guinea or Algeria, have always followed such options. Thus, we were among the first within the EEC to recognize the new State of Angola, and it is not our fault if our relations with some progressive Portuguese-speaking countries have not as yet become as developed as current interests would require. In this connection, it is conceived that a decisive improvement of our relations with Algeria, should this be possible, could consolidate the calming down of relations which have already been established in our contacts with a number of African states classified as progressive. Generally speaking, the latter must become convinced that even if we intend to defend ourselves from the calumnies occasionally generously formulated on our account, and eliminate any foreign takeover of African states, their political option does not constitute, in itself, an obstacle to mutually profitable cooperation, and that we clearly have no objection whatever to the diversification of their international life. A very clear illustration of this French attitude was provided quite recently in the course of the trip to Paris by Sassou-Nguesso, the Congolese chief of state.

A Broader Opening

Whereas our activities remain for quite some time restricted to the boundaries of our old colonial possessions, in the past few years France has tried to gradually broaden its range of action among the African states. This broader geographic opening is based on a number of reasons. The first is the awareness that African problems are gradually assuming a global dimension and that we are being asked, ever more frequently, to intervene in matters which, originally, did not concern us directly. Such was the case, for example, of all problems related to the situation in southern Africa. Secondly, we must well bear in mind linguistic affinities which have naturally encouraged us to develop rather close relations with countries where, as in the case of states created from the former Belgian possessions in Africa, or British territories in the Indian Ocean, the French language is currently used. Yet, the main reason for the broadening of our relations is the growing importance of inter-African relations on the regional level. It is thus that the various states in western Africa have realigned themselves within a number of regional organizations such as the CEAO [West African Economic

Community], the Council of the Entente, the CEDEAO [West African States Economic Community], etc., and that, in that same area, both English and Portuguese-speaking countries, surrounded by the bulk of French-speaking countries, feel very strongly the need to develop contacts of all kinds with France along with the French-speaking countries surrounding them.

The most striking examples of our desire to broaden relations include the quite significant increase, in percentage terms, of funds appropriated for technical cooperation with African non-French-speaking countries (previously negligible with the exception of Ethiopia), the trips taken over the past three years by the minister of foreign affairs and his secretary of state to some 10 English-speaking and Portuguese-speaking countries, the invitations to visit Paris extended to a number of leaders of these same countries, and the progressive opening of Franco-African conferences to new members. Let us recall here the slow yet steady increase of African participation in such "family reunions:" During the last summit meeting held most successfully in Rwanda, 24 countries were represented (there are 49 members of the OAU). Let us also mention our intention, announced precisely in Kigali, to give a positive response to requests for aid which may be addressed to us by the African regional economic organizations.

On a more modest level, I consider it equally significant to point out the reorganization of the Office of African and Malagasy affairs office of the Quai d'Orsay which, after its accomplishment in 1978, marked the elimination of a historical division based on linguistic criteria in favor of a purely geographic system.

Actually, it would be legitimate to ask oneself if, drawing the logical consequences of a globalizing of its African policy, it would not be in the interest of the French government to regroup its various fields of competence in terms of cooperation, currently divided between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (North African countries, non-French-speaking countries in black Africa, and Guinea) and the Ministry of Cooperation (French-speaking countries in black Africa, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, Sao Tome-Principe, and Equatorial Guinea). This task could be advantageously assigned to an important secretariat of state under the authority of the minister of foreign affairs.

Finally, in the past few months, the African policy of our country has assumed a new significance which should be considered on the global scale. Aware of the economic and geopolitical imperatives which the organization of major continental groups implies on the international level, and wishing to preserve France's and Europe's opportunities in the current world, while strengthening the specific nature of the developing countries living next door to us, the chief of state has emphasized on several occasions the urgent need to strengthen the ties of solidarity which link us in all areas with such nations, African nations in particular.

An initial approach was taken in 1977, when Giscard d'Estaing launched the idea of a "solidarity pact" between Europe and Africa. At that time the suggestion met with an excellent welcome on the part of a number of French-speaking countries, specifically the Ivory Coast and Senegal. However, it was criticized by the Soviet press and by Algeria under President Boumedienne.

On 15 February 1979 the President of the Republic voiced it again with certain modifications. At that time he called for a summit meeting among European, African, and Arab countries. The major lines of the proposition were formulated in May, on the occasion of the sixth Franco-African Kigali conference, in the following terms: "In order to maintain the equilibrium of tomorrow's world, the countries of western Europe, Africa, and the Near East should consider the means to interlink their destinies more closely. The approach we are contemplating is essentially political. It could be concretized in its final stage in a summit conference attended by the leaders of the interested countries. One day, it could also assume the shape of a document, a real solidarity charter, which would govern the rules of behavior among such states."

In Kigali the African representatives had a unanimously favorable reaction to the suggestion formulated by the French president: The final communique emphasizes that the conferences "adopted" his plan. The following day, on his way back, paying a working state visit to Khartoum, the chief of state submitted his ideas to General Nimeiri, president of Sudan, a country placed between the Arab and black African countries, and who was then president of the OAU. Here again the suggestion was received most favorably.

However, this "trialogue" should not be considered a magic formula. The implementation of such an extensive and complex plan as the one suggested by France would come across obstacles even if only by virtue of the number and diversity of the countries involved. One of the major difficulties to be surmounted, unquestionably, would be the current division within the Arab world. However, the possibility for a "trialogue" should be considered for the future, and there is no reason to think that it could not be accomplished in the near or more distant future. Important Arab countries in the Middle East have already expressed their interest. Nothing illustrates better the tangible and specific nature of the ties which already link the European, African, and Arab worlds than the fact that they account, among them, for some 67 percent of their global external exchanges. The growth of the energy crisis provides us, should we need it, with an additional reason for advancing research and joint thinking in this direction.

FOOTNOTES

1. See PROJET, No 136, June 1979, "Africa, An International Stake," and D.-G. Lavroff, "The African Stakes," DEFENSE NATIONALE, December 1978.

2. See LE MONDE, 29 November 1979.
3. For greater details see A. Farhi, "Resources and Markets," PROJET, No 136.
4. See LE MONDE, 26 October 1979. In his speech in the course of the budget debate, Couve de Murville was to emphasize this point.
5. On the origin of the current situation see J. A., "Chad Today," PROJET, No 136.
6. To determine the size of the problem see the article by R. Bureau, "African Involvement in Industry," PROJET, No 139, November 1979.

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CSO: 3100

IMPLICATION OF 'PRUD'HOMME' ELECTION RESULTS FOR LABOR

Paris PROJET in French Feb 80 pp 130-134

[Article by Bernard Lestienne: "A Trade Union Premiere"]

[Text] The "prud'homme" elections of 12 December 1979 were a great premiere. The favorable result of this national poll constitutes the most eloquent funeral eulogy for Robert Boulin, chief architect of the new law (18 January 1979). In the climate of gloom in which we are thrust by too narrow political debates, these elections have been characterized by an outburst as surprising as it is unexpected. In the privacy of the polling booths, wage earners have expressed their opinion straight out on the role of trade union organizations. "It is a new period in social history," one leader commented. The *tr* remains to be converted. The importance of the reform and the polling method will leave a mark on the future of French trade unionism. Already the results make it possible to evaluate the forces facing one another. Without claiming that we can determine the precise impact of the new date, let us nevertheless wager that it will not be minimal.

Each organization had fully entered the electoral campaign, sometimes profiting by genuine partisan support. The competition was vigorous, giving rise, on a smaller scale, to proceedings altogether too similar to those of political consultations. In the light of the results, each confederation of affiliated trade unions expressed genuine satisfaction.

The first surprise--the strong participation: 61 percent of those registered: undoubtedly a little less than the average in the elections for the replacement of the joint production committees (72 percent), but well beyond the expectation of the trade union confederations themselves. All the more since the voters almost unanimously (95 percent) chose the representative organizations; the 21 percent of the votes usually obtained in joint production committee elections by independent trade union or nonunion candidates were picked up almost in totality by the "recognized" organizations (8.1 percent by FO [Workers Force], 4.2 percent by the CFTC [French Confederation of Christian Workers], 3.6 percent by the CFTD [French Democratic Confederation of Labor], 2.4 percent by the CGT [General

Confederation of Labor]; the "miscellaneous" won 3 percent, while the CGC [General Confederation of Managerial Personnel] lost 0.4 percent; these percentages are to be evaluated in terms of the relative power of each trade union confederation. This constitutes another element of success. The final results provide a better knowledge of the representativeness of each confederation. To this specific reference we can henceforth compare the results of the various wage-earner consultations.

With 42 percent of the votes, the CGT remains ahead by far. The slight consolidation which it shows with regard to 1962 is less than that feared by some responsible persons. The disappointment, discernible from some comments, probably originates less from the results it has achieved than from the strengthening of other trade union confederations. In industry, it is maintaining a clearer lead than in the other sections. The greatest setback is that of leaving second place, after the CGC, to the CFDT, its partner in the managerial section.

As for the CFDT--relief and satisfaction. The goal of 20 percent held in view was amply surpassed. In comparison with the joint production committee elections, the gain is real. The isolation felt since March 1978, the policy of readjustment, the somewhat startling public positions taken by its secretary general have not affected the organization's identifying image. Emphasis is placed on the homogeneity of the score in the different sections and on the light but effective penetration in the departments south of the Loire where establishment of unions was traditionally weak. The good results in the managerial and agriculture sections are encouraging. After the difficult and decisive congress of Brest (May 1979), this score confirms the confederal team for the implementation of the new line of action.

Workers Force, which, more than others, feared these elections, come out of them a great victor. With regard to his detractors, A. Bergeron is amply gratified by his tenacity. His organization picked up a good number of votes which, in the other elections, went to the "nonunion" candidates. Another satisfaction: the good distribution of the results over the territory as a whole and the constant advancement of FO in the private sector.

As for the CFTC, the consultation could have tolled the passing bell. On the contrary, it shows a clear advance, achieves a new legitimacy and confirms its presence on the trade union checkerboard.

The CGC remains the foremost confederation of managerial trade unions, but its results are mediocre. The four other workers' confederations obtained together 55.6 percent of the managerial section votes, and UCC [expansion unknown] and UGICT [General Union of Engineers, Administrative Personnel, and Technicians] together made a score nearly equivalent to the CGC. If the growing salarization of managerial staff explains in part this swing toward workers' organizations, it is also the consequence of the too long absence of a leader. J. Menu will have to do a good housecleaning in order to reform his union.

What should we retain from these results? Interpretations vary. There are some who emphasize the strengthening of the reformist trade union confederations. For others, in 1962--the date of the last national wage-earner consultation--the positions of the CFTC of that time were near those of the present CFTC; on the other hand, in spite of the 1964 split, the CFDT, which practices unity of action with the CGT, is today strengthening its influence on new positions of class struggle taken in 1970. However, the major indication of the "prud'homme" elections remains the established fact of an astonishing stability. Except for a few readjustments, each organization sees itself affirmed in its specificity and its function. These elections confirm the present composition of the French trade union movement in its diversity: the cleavages will become more visible from now on. If some rebalancing and some changes take shape, they will be very gradual. Any significant, abrupt change within the two great families, revolutionary (CGT and CFDT) and reformist (FO, CFTC and CGC), or between these two families, will not be achieved without a destabilization of the whole. It is advisable to take into account the exact measure of the existence of different feelings and traditions. It is a mistake to think and act as if the strengthening of one trade union confederation would necessarily require the weakening of another: within each trend of opinion, a significant setback for one organization would not be without harm to its partner.

The elimination of the bogus trade unions increases the authority of the trade union confederations; but what is important is the dynamics started by the "prud'homme" reform. From now on, every three years, a similar poll will reelect half the counsellors. This universal suffrage, each time concerning some 7 million electors, strengthens the position of the trade unions and makes their role official. The growing institutionalization of trade unionism is going through a decisive stage. With regard to the government and the employers, the trade union confederations, whose influence will be better defined, are acquiring additional power and influence, which are modifying to some extent the balance of power. If the other polls (election of shop stewards and members of the CE's) remain important, designation by universal suffrage confers a moral authority. In the long run, the trade union movement could thus strengthen its autonomy and play a more decisive role in determining the social trends of the country. Confirmed in its position of leading social interlocutor, trade unionism will be better able to specify and to bring out a logic that is well and truly syndical, thus consolidating its influence with regard to that of the political parties.

The "prud'homme" reform also opens up a new strategic terrain to the trade unions. Until now, even in the opinion of the CGT, which maintained almost a complete monopoly among the wage-earner counsellors, it was a mistake on the part of the trade unions not to take more interest in the "prud'hommes", which represent an original jurisdiction, because those who sit on them are not magistrates by profession but wage-earner and employer counsellors, in equal numbers, elected by the users. With the passing years, these legal proceedings, up to then governed by a law dating back to 1907, had

become unsuitable. The law of 18 January 1979--whose major point of controversy remains the division of the wage-earner counsellors into five sections--brings significant improvements, in particular, the territorial and professional generalization of the jurisdiction of the boards. The electoral campaigns, which will recur every 3 years, will invite important changes in the habitual routine of trade unionism. The first campaign bears witness to this. The need for making oneself understood, for reaching the greatest number of workers, beyond the limits of the enterprise, makes it necessary to take into account the diversity of situations, to explain further, abandoning the jargon comprehensible only to the initiated. In France, where unionization is weak, campaigns can likewise become occasions for the implementation of a genuine mass trade unionism. The interprofessional nature of the pool confirms the responsibility for initiative and coordination on the part of the local structures in the ever more difficult building of working-class unity.

For the trade unions, the benefit of the reforms goes beyond the period of the electoral campaigns. The elected counsellors, more often requested by adherents and sympathizers, will be induced to open their minds to the problems of the nonunion workers and will thereby better understand the situations of the underunionized professional sectors. But the counsellors are not only judges; they remain militants linked to their organization. The juridical training they receive, the opening up to the problems of all workers, the knowledge of situations acquired in the exercise of their function will be reflected in their structures, and their influence with the others elected (shop stewards or members of the CE's) will grow. The trade unions will be more at ease in negotiating collective agreements, in making suitable proposals in certain branches so far neglected, particularly on behalf of the most marginal workers.

Indeed, only individual cases are within the competence of the "prud'hommes," and the boards deal with disputes between employer and employee. The "prud'hommes" cannot take a decision of a general nature concerning the application of a law or of a collective agreement.

The wage earner acts on his own, even if the trade union can support him in his actions and defend him juridically. Some organizations see in this personal right a risk of individualism, a danger of reformist illusion or the trap of integration by judicial expedient. Now, the first aim of trade union action is the collective organization of the workers; individual judicial action cannot replace protest action. The "prud'homme" board appears to them to be a resort in the absence of a sufficiently powerful collective organization; besides, the disputants are more numerous in enterprises with a low unionization rate. But a more frequent seizure of the "prud'hommes" ought to bring the new counsellors to seek how to bring to maturity the collective awareness latent in every conflict--even an individual one--and make it lead to a greater concern for organization, indeed, toward unionization.

Six hundred days after the declarations of intent concerning a social opening up, shortly after March 1973, there are some who rightly draw up a negative balance sheet for the government's policy of collective negotiations. As for the employers, they have put themselves in chilly, wait-and-see positions. The reform of the "prud'hommes" and the elections of 12 December represent a significant advance in the dialog. They express the attachment of the French to trade unionism and have started a dynamic which it is now up to the trade unions to maintain. In the long run, the true significance of the reform cannot yet be appreciated. The new "prud'hommes" will be, for the most part, what the trade unions make of them.

POURCENTAGES OBTENUS PAR LES DIFFERENTES ORGANISATIONS
SYNDICALES LORS DES CONSULTATIONS DE L'ENSEMBLE DES SALARIES (1) (1)

	Inscrits	Participa- tion	CGT	CFDT	FO	CFTC	CGC	(4)	(5)
(2) Sécurité sociale 1962			44.3	21.0 (CFTC)	14.7		4.7		
CE 1976-77			39.8	19.8	9.2	3	5.8		22.8(3)
Prud'hommes 1979									
(6) Voix	12 812 812	60.9	42.2	23.2	17.3	7.2	5.2		4.8
(7) Sieges (2)			41.6	26.4	18.6	3.2	8.3		1.8
(8) Fonction publique sans éducation nationale (4)	1 372 421	81.2	39.1	19.1	27.1	4.3	1.0	0.02	9.3
(9) Éducation nationale (4)	767 537	74.9	8.5	13.6	2.6	0.8	1.5	63.7	9.3
Total	14 952 770		39.84	22.15	17.58	8.46	4.51	3.66	5.59

- (10) (1) Tableau en partie communiqué par le service de presse de la CFDT
(11) (2) En fonction du système dit de la plus forte moyenne
(12) (3) Syndicats autonomes : 4.3 % ; syndicats divers : 1.8 % ; non-syndiqués : 16.7 %
(13) (4) Désignation des représentants aux commissions administratives paritaires en 1977-78-79.

Key:

1. Percentages obtained by the various trade union organizations in the consultation of all wage earners
2. Social security
3. Registered
4. (National Education Federation)
5. Miscellaneous
6. Votes
7. Seats
8. Civil service without national education
9. National education
10. Table in part communicated by CFDT publicity department
11. In terms of the so-called strongest average system
12. Independent trade unions: 4.3 percent; miscellaneous trade unions: 1.8 percent; nonunion: 16.7 percent
13. Designation of representatives to administrative commissions with workers' participation in 1977-78-79.

ROCARD-MITTERRAND STRUGGLE, DIFFERENCES TRACED

Paris LE POINT in French 3 Mar 80 pp A2-43

Article by Andre Chambrud and Daniele Melus: "Rocard-Mitterrand, War of the Roses"

[Text] The Mitterrand-Rocard confrontation as candidates for the presidency is a grand opening. Yet, it is also the upshot of a secret war which has been tearing the left apart for the past 20 years. Following is its strange history.

"The Socialist Party is lucky to have two possible candidates who respect and value each other. (. . .) The choice will be made without a clash. There will be no primaries, for both of us are strong supporters of party unity. . . ." Watchful, both of others and himself, the wrinkles on his forehead barely emphasized by the lights, his hair impeccably short and black, Michel Rocard, 49, performed, last Monday, in front of the Antenne 1 cameras, the supreme act of the politician: openly stating to the country that he wants to be president and considers himself able to do so.

Naturally, this event had been so heavily anticipated that, the next day, it did not make big headlines in the press. Rocard appears so firm, the international situation so worrisome, the presidential elections so distant and the left so much lacking, that one merely registers the fact dispassionately. Yet, while Rocard speaks, how not to consider the thought recently expressed by someone close to Giscard: "All men of politics are crazy, for it is politics that makes them crazy. There is no other type of activity in which an individual would be asked to face a camera to say, 'I am the strongest, the best, and the most intelligent.'" Such an individual would be either kicked out or immediately locked up.

Yet, one reason why Michel Rocard be took the risk of being the first to blurt--an early--into battle is, obviously, because, before having

Anti-Gaullism. Virtually the entire intelligentsia at the time thought that Gaullism was a temporary phenomenon, horribly primitive, and deeply regressive;

Rebellion against the institutionalized left: Guy Mollet and the PCF, no, thank you!

Technocracy. A few high officials with brilliant minds, Michel Rocard being one of them, have assembled at the Jean-Moulin Club, which is drafting quite intelligent reforms in the hope that they will be implemented following General de Gaulle's departure;

Finally, militancy. In Michel Rocard's case, at least, there is a deep conviction that thought and action must be linked, and that it is not enough to dream about the world but that one must change it. Made wiser, like his entire generation, by the war in Algeria, this young bourgeois would like to become a teacher. Born a protestant, he would like to reconcile the Christian and the laic currents. He believes that political success can only be the consequence of a change of behaviors and mentalities. Let us not forget that those were times of optimism: Children were still being born in France, and the expansion appeared endless; finally, since de Gaulle was watching, one could afford to juggle concepts and even, to a certain extent, play with the word "revolution." There was time.

Yet, on 17 October 1964, Francois Mitterrand's candidacy faces the PSU with one of those simple problems which horrify it: Should the party support him or not? Naturally, the PSU splits. It is whispered that Mitterrand had recently tried to link to the PSU the PSA (Autonomous Socialist Party) and that Alain Savary had politely sent him packing. Finally, it was Georges Servet who signed the saving, if not the simplifying amendment: The PCF would support Mitterrand candidacy, for lack of anything better, but would conduct an independent critical campaign. Mitterrand's appreciation was moderate but the entire matter was secondary. Actually, he did not even know who this Georges Servet was.

The celebration--austere, as it were--of the new left took place in Grenoble, on 30 April 1966. Summoned as a result of the call of journalists such as Jean Daniel (LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR), Jean-Marie Domenach (ESPRESSO), and Georges Montaron (TEMOIGNAGE CHRETIEN) and personalities of the PSU, the UNEF [National Union of French Students], the CFTD [French Democratic Confederation of Labor], the agricultural trade unions, and the Young Cadres Association, this colloquium tries to lay the foundations of a new way of leftist thinking and mark the entry in the political arena "of a new generation for whom Gaullism is already obsolete and the Fourth Republic a memory of school days." The star was Pierre Mendes France; one of the speakers--still unknown yet,

for the first time since the press-war Georges Seryet; the great absence was François Mitterrand. He who, four months earlier, had brilliantly challenged General de Gaulle for the presidency, is still not very healthy, and only André Aron (MRG) and Marc Paillet, close to him, was even heard. Hence the comment by Raymond Barrillon in LE MONDE: "It is quite extraordinary that in his opening speech Mr Serge Mallet (PSU) did not refer to the president-elect Mitterrand without mentioning a single word of François Mitterrand himself. . . . Everything in Grenoble was reminiscent of 1966, as though the Communist Party did not exist." Henry the poetists in Jean Duvet in LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: "After the last round in the presidential elections, the French have discovered that the last half a century of appeasement which threatened the Gaullist system. The battle for this year, among others, to François Mitterrand. . . . After this year Sunday the French have discovered an equally important statement. The Grenoble meeting brings to mind the existence of new forces of young radicals with groups able to offer the country an alternative to the old system of going beyond and of philosophy."

Jean Duvet's conclusion is that these two steps are not "antagonistic" but "complementary". He is writing at least as far as the last point is concerned: "In eight year periods, i.e., between 1966 and 1974, there are certainly some antagonism between the two steps. Regardless of the May 1968 revolution. In 1968, the winning step was that of François Mitterrand."

We are finally in with the two simple ideas which have guided the Nievre Deputy during this whole period:

The first one will be that only 12 to 14 per cent

This unit is available only if a big socialist party is organized, to counter the PCP. Mitterrand has pursued this zealously. First through the expansion of the PSU (Evolution of the Democratic and Socialist Left), then with the coalition of the Socialist Party on the wreckage of the SFIO.

The second one is that the Socialist Party-PCP alliance to be conflicting. The PCP would not change and a relatively stable cooperation would remain possible in 1968. It would persevere in its ideas and, in the face of a Socialist Party coloured on the left, would be doomed to a defeat.

In 1968, however, François Mitterrand thought that he was nearing his objective. The PSU, among socialist groups in the March legislative elections, had 100,000 votes. The Communists obtained the majority by a single vote, all of a sudden. Prime Minister Georges Pompidou found himself faced with a revolutionary situation. The May 1968 occurred in May 1968, for instance, not only because of the students as well because of social

reasons--the stagnation of the workers' purchasing power. The first victim General de Gaulle; his authority was weakened; he was to leave the government less than one year later. The second victim was Francois Mitterrand, for the students who occupied the Sorbonne, or the workers who marched in the street neither felt like it nor thought of turning to him who, nevertheless, announced himself to be "ready." Actually, they did not turn any more to Pierre Mendes France or the PCF. In that jolly month of May, with the sun shining every day, the dreams went elsewhere; no attention was being paid to politics and the making of a revolution was forgotten.

Yet, as a result of a curious twist in the circumstances, two people emerge strengthened by the event: Georges Pompidou, who, on this occasion, graduated as a statesman, and Michel Rocard who, with the PSU, whose national secretary he had been since 1967, participated in the demonstrations, and endorsed the challenge while, at the same time, tried to channel it. The others realize, therefore, that he is opposed to any kind of violence: He is even suspected of being quick to provide a political interpretation to the confused claims formulated by the May movement.

General de Gaulle resigned following his failure at the April 1969 referendum. Discredited by his blunders in May, having sunk very low, Francois Mitterrand did not become a candidate. However, after sounding Pierre Mendes France out, Michel Rocard plunges into the adventure. He was to garner no more than 3.61 percent of the vote. Yet, in addition to the fact that the official candidate of the noncommunist left Gaston Defferre, was to do slightly better (5.01 percent), Michel Rocard impressed, thanks to television, his image as a terribly young, seductive, and somewhat ambiguous young man. Let us remember that as early as the end of 1969 an initial public opinion poll showed that over 45 percent of those polled had a favorable opinion of him as against less than 35 percent in the case of Francois Mitterrand.

As of then, for several months, Michel Rocard was to think that the PSU could become the major party of the noncommunist left: Everything seemed to indicate that Mitterrand was dead and that the future belonged to Rocard.

This illusion was not to last long, for as early as August 1968, a major event occurred: Disapproving the Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia, the PCF showed that it had decided to emancipate itself from the USSR and come out of its ghetto.

Matters proceeded slowly. Three years later, however, at the Epinay Congress (1971), when Francois Mitterrand surprisingly took over the leadership of the Socialist Party, the Communists accept the inevitable. The idea of a joint program is promoted. It is negotiated and, in June 1972, concluded. In the 1973 legislative elections the united left is

able to regain some of the positions lost in 1968. Within that period, definitely in the margin, the PSU exhausts itself through silly quarrels and, following the death of Georges Pompidou, on 2 April 1974, Michel Rocard is one of the very first to suggest Mitterrand's candidacy. This comes as a sweet revenge for the first secretary of the Socialist Party, and as an accurate assessment of reality. However, it is also proof of Rocard's failure.

Regardless of the media campaign waged by the entire left, both the communists and Rocard, François Mitterrand does not win the victory but comes close to it. And, since the new president, VGE (Valéry Giscard d'Estaing) appears weak, the opposition remains hopeful: next time. Actually, the proof that François Mitterrand henceforth rules the left and that his judgment was accurate, is that Michel Rocard let it be known that he was ready to leave the PSU to rejoin the Socialist Party together with a few friends. Pierre Mauroy becomes the middleman. Mitterrand is hesitant. A decisive moment has arrived.

In Michel Rocard's view, the decision to rejoin the Socialist Party is the result of a long maturing period. His initial encounter with François Mitterrand goes back to the 1967 legislative elections and the impression he has retained is that, in 1971, when the Nièvre deputy emerged the winner in Epigny, Rocard did not believe in the renovation of the Socialist Party "which," says he, "I have had eight years of SFIO under my skin and I am too used to the disparity between words and actions." Yet, slowly, he amends his judgment and admits, that professional politician though he might be, Mitterrand acted, in this occurrence, as an "immature." One day, in October 1972, reading an editorial article in *LE MONDE* on himself and the PSU, he thoughtfully remarked: "When I become the boss of the Socialist Party they will no longer speak of us in this manner."

His final decision came with the 1974 presidential elections campaign. As early as Monday, 8 April, Jacques Aitali asked him to work for Mitterrand; he accepted immediately and the welcome he received in Montfermeil was warm. "This was not idyllic period," Rocard was to say later, "the best." Indeed, François Mitterrand trusted him, loaded him with work, and, and then, with Aitali, to Bonn to make sure the German authorities, should the left win, would not act against France. Yet, between the two electoral rounds, matters were beginning to spoil somewhat. There were a few principal differences and hurt sensitivities. Claude Marti, who "always" adores, had made a poor impression. . . . Actually, nothing serious. For, in terms of Rocard, the choice was no longer between a broken up PSU and the Socialist Party, but between the (broken) PSU and nothing.

Therefore, Mitterrand is in a position of strength and, the moment Rocard receives his request, his initial reaction is to say no. In the

three years that he has spent heading the Socialist Party, this loner has learned the price at which party unity can be maintained. Furthermore, he is not all too fond of such Johnnies-come-lately who have come to claim their proper place whereas for so many years they have been suspicious, have underestimated, and have almost engaged in ridiculing. If it had only been a case of Rocard alone! Yet, he hears from all sides that in the course of 25 years of life within the movement, the PSU leader has woven among public officials, the trade unions, the employers, and the press a strong network of friendships which remain with a Christian predominance which rubs him the wrong way not because he does not like Christians but because he thinks that politically they are never reliable and loyal. "I am the new left," he likes to repeat. "The others are the representatives of the old left, the left which blabbers, argues, and always fails."

Yet, Francois Mitterrand is confident. He is an optimist--perhaps excessively so--and trusting in the future, i.e., in the 1978 legislative elections, he tells himself that Rocard is no longer all that important and that the fact that the last rebels holding out have joined the Socialist Party would obviously be of symbolic importance, not to mention of election interest. He lets himself be convinced: The socialist congress will celebrate this reunion providing, naturally, that both Rocard and his supporters join without any demands.

That is what eventually takes place and, as frequently happens in history, Rocard's humiliation would also be a proclamation of his resurrection!

On 5 and 6 October 1974, in Orleans, Michel Rocard tried to defend the theses of the participation of the PSU in the socialist congress through his party's national council. However, he finds himself very much in the minority and, quite quickly, in the position of a defendant. Chain smoking Gauloises, frowning, tense, he defends himself as best he can against the charge of treason but makes a bad exit in an atmosphere marked by snarling and resentment. He claims to take with him two-thirds of the PSU but no more than 1,000 of his comrades would follow him in joining the Socialist Party.

On 13 October 1974, Sunday, at 1600 hours, in the overheated hall of a big hotel in Paris, the socialist congress is amiably dragging its proceedings. At the bar Michel Rocard tells his friend Jacques Chereque, from the CFDT: "Jacques, what we have done today is the most important step taken by the left for many years." Pierre Joxe, passing by, overhears this and likes the statement even less considering the fact that he is in the company of Claude Germon, of the CGT, and who fears that, henceforth, the trade union area covered by the Socialist Party may go to the CFDT alone. He turns around, looks at Rocard, and says drily, "When you jump on the bandwagon you don't turn it back. . . ."

At this point let us interrupt the tale of the Mitterrand-Rocard relations. The well-familiar sequence is part of our most recent history, a history which is always unpredictable and yet always lasting like a sentence. François Mitterrand likes to repeat that, "When the union of the left works well the French vote for me; when it becomes strained they drop me." This is confirmed by the fact that with the 22 September 1977 breakup of the renegotiations of the common program, the failure of the left in the 1978 legislative elections, and the Afghanistan affair, the union of the left entered a state of agony. Not only is the PCF not pretending to promote unity but, in a series of fits, it seems to be looking for a type of isolation, unprecedented since 1939, when it had approved the German-Soviet pact. Even during the cold war it had tried to outpace its fellow travelers. Today it does not have a single one left.

Was this fatal and, therefore, predictable? Let us admire those who claim so. Rocard himself, joining the Socialist Party, had not foreseen it. However, the question of the rivalry between the two men can be considered only on the basis of three criteria: their respective images, the strategy of change they offer, and their true intention..

No doubt exists as to the first item: For the time being Rocard has crushed Mitterrand. He is younger, he seems fresher, and has known less defeat. Naturally, but, above all, because the terribly simplistic nature of presidential mechanisms lead public opinion to the following elementary reasoning: "Since despite so many favorable occasions Mitterrand has not succeeded, let us try Rocard. His chances may be poor but the experiment is worth while."

Mitterrand's supporters hope that the socialist membership will not abandon him in this fight. Yet, it is virtually unavoidable and, unquestionably, Alain Touraine, the sociologist, is right when he writes in LE MATIN: "The Socialist Party is, first of all, a party of voters: How could its supporters fail to react to the strong push of public opinion, and how could its leaders themselves not seek a solution consistent with this demand?"

Several months ago LE POINT had hypothesized four scenarios of the Mitterrand-Rocard primary. According to the fourth one Mitterrand would be a candidate but, faced with public opinion apathy and poor polling results, he would drop out and let Rocard try his luck. At that time, many Rocard supporters had considered this hypothesis likely. It so happened, however, Rocard being the first to take off, that the opposite situation resulted. Until autumn Rocard must perform well: Should he flinch he would be in danger. Yet, his televised interview, last Monday, raised the party to a crucial point: The communists being what they are, and Rocard being what he is, how does he hope to garner the 10 percent of the electorate vote to be elected? Mitterrand's

solution had been a union of the left; on Monday Rocard did not suggest a different one, for the simple reason that arithmetically, at least, no other solution exists.

The essential remains, i.e., the apparant irrationality which marks all French presidential elections: The fact that in 1965 Mitterrand succeeded in forcing de Gaulle into a second ballot, that in 1969 Gaston Defferre garnered only five percent of the vote, and that in 1974 it took one week for Giscard to knock Chaban out, was not written in the stars. Those events did take place because, relatively disciplined when it comes to local or legislative elections, the electorate seems to turn itself loose in the presidential elections which become "its own" matter, rather than that of the parties. Hence, the only serious question is to know whether, faced with Rocard, whose talent is obvious, there does exist a latent Rocard movement in the country or, in other terms, whether or not the personality he represents and the ideas he voices meet with the expectations of the French people today.

"Rocard d'Estaing" said once the socialist Jean Poperen, ironically. The term was less stinging than he thought. Indeed, we find in Rocard, as in Giscard, a rejection of lyricism, a way of appealing to the mind more than to the heart and the guts which respond to the spirit of the times. Both these ENA [National Administration School] graduates have the art to work with a small, discreet and efficient team, supported by extensive and informal areas of influence. Both share the conviction that politics is the art of the possible: The fact that last Monday Rocard abandoned the term "self-management," which had marked his entire career, is the very symbol of the empiricism which he guiding him henceforth. Finally, both men pay the same attention to a few facts which characterize the development of French society today: the individualizing of claims, their nature which has become more qualitative than quantitative, the "recentering" of trade unions such as the CFDT or even the FEN [National Education Federation], the new interest in culture, the aspiration of each one to achieve greater autonomy, and the developmer^t of partnerships.

Naturally, ~~Rocard~~ ^{Giscard}, like a good conservative, is satisfied with going along with this development, whereas Rocard, as a reformer, would like to guide and urge it on. That is where they differ. Yet, if this is indeed what France in 1980 is, then, yes, there probably is a Rocard movement which could become apparent in a few weeks.

Conversely, should this image of France, in fact, be an obsolete image which had developed during the gentle times of detente and of the expansion and the illusions of 1968, but whose paints have been peeling off as of 1974, under the perverse effects of unemployment, economic dislocation, and international crisis, or in a word, if France is swollen with new types of tensions, confrontations, and conflicts, the

Rocardian style would be considered artificial and unsuitable to the French.

Such are, therefore, the history, the extent and the significance of the war of the roses, and it would be entirely hopeless to try to determine its outcome 16 months before the elections. It could be that Mitterrand would pass on the leadership and retire. It is also possible that, coldly and methodically, he would like to safeguard the unity of the Socialist Party, regardless of anyone or anything, and win in the arm wrestling contest he started, 15 years ago, with the PCF. His point was either to force it to change or to diminish it. Rocard's point is to go forth without being hypnotized by any given problem.

As one may see, the socialists are faced with a major choice, for the only event which could, one day, free the communist electorate is the terrifying party-breaking machine of the presidential elections. Would that occur as early as 1981? One could dream of it, assuming that the Socialist Party keeps cool and does not fall apart between now and then.

5137

CS01 3100

AIR TRANSPORT COMMAND AWAITS NEW TRANSALL AIRCRAFT

PARIS AVIATION MAGAZINE INTERNATIONAL in French 1-14 Mar 80 pp 20-22

[Article by Pierre Condom: "COTAM [Military Air Transport Command], When the New Transall Will Arrive....the Good Old Nord 2501 Will Vanish"]

[Text] Chad, Kolwezi, Gafsa, French interventions in Africa with which France keeps its commitments in this part of the world have increased in slightly over one year. These events have emphasized the role of military air transport which is, precisely, on the eve of a change which will enable it to increase its capacity by replacing the old Nord 2501 with a new series of Transall which can be refueled in flight.

The first C-160 Transall of the second series will arrive in Evreux at the end of 1981. The air force is planning the purchase of 25 such airplanes which offer new possibilities compared with the C-160 already in operation. Their commissioning will coincide with the gradual withdrawal of the old Nord 2501 which, for several decades, accounted for most of the capacity of the COTAM, the military air transport command.

With increased fuel-holding capacity--fully fueled they can now carry 20 tons--and a possibility for refueling in the air, the new Transall, all of which will be based in Evreux, will make possible foreign interventions as far as 4,500 to 6,000 kilometers away, i.e., for example, they could fly to Djibouti, Zaire, the Antilles or Guyana, covering the entire range of French political interests.

It is still somewhat premature to determine exactly, on the practical level, the advantages of the second series Transalls. However, it is already certain that the 26,000 liters of fuel which can be contained by the new main tank will enable the new C-160 to fly over 6,000 kilometers without being refueled in the air.

The increased capacity of the tanks and refueling in flight open very interesting possibilities which could be described with a few figures. On a 2,500 nautical miles run (4,630 kilometers), quite representative of the cases which may arise, the new version of the C-160, with a

maximum takeoff mass of 51 tons, could carry 7 tons of cargo; refueled after 500 nautical miles (926 kilometers) from takeoff, i.e., virtually on national soil, it could haul 10 tons of freight; with more fueling in the air (4.5 rather than 3 tons of fuel) at 800 nautical miles (1,480 kilometers) from takeoff, it could haul 11.6 tons.

The game becomes even more significant if we consider a factual case such as, for example, the haulage of 70 tons of materiel over a distance of 7,500 nautical miles, needed for the deployment of an intervention unit. Without refueling this operation would require 10 Transall and 105 flight hours or, with the return to the base, a total of 210 flight hours. Refueled after 500 nautical miles, it would require no more than seven C-160 transport airplanes and two C-160 supply airplanes, or a total of nine, and a total flight time of 158 hours, representing a 25 percent gain. Refueled after 800 nautical miles, this would require six transport and three fuel airplanes which, together, would have 148 flight hours, showing a gain of 30 percent. Independently from this gain, two practical elements must be remembered: The refueling Transalls return directly to their takeoff base where they become immediately available for other missions; refueling in flight avoids the need to have at the place of intervention more C-160 than are necessary to do the job.

Aerospatiale is studying the possibility to raise the maximum mass in flight to 40 tons. This would increase even further the advantage of refueling in the air. In the previous example the mission would thus require five transport airplanes and five supply airplanes; it would require no more than 130 hours in the air or a saving of 38 percent.

In the mid-1980's the air force will have 73 Transalls, consisting of the 48 currently in operation and the 25 of the new series. As the new C-160 are put into service, the Nord 2501 will be retired. This loss of potential, combined with fuel restrictions, should result in a stagnation of the annual potentials in terms of tons/kilometers for the 1980-1981 transition period. However, starting with 1982, assuming that the fuel problems do not worsen, the COTAM would be able to increase quite substantially its service facilities.

The idea occasionally mentioned of completing the Transall fleet with a smaller large plane such as the C-222 (a version with new Tyne motors was offered to France by Aeritalia), does not seem to gain support. In normal times the C-160 of the COTAM work for a number of "clients" simultaneously, and fly with a high load coefficient. In times of crisis, everything has been planned in terms of crews and spare parts, for a serious upgrading which would quickly double activities for a period of several months.

It is rather the opposite, an airplane which could cover long distances with heavy cargo, that would be a proper complement to the Transall fleet.

The air force already has a DC-8-62 and three DC-8-51. Current plans call for improving this long distance capacity by installing on the DC-8-62 Snecma/General Electric CFM 56 engines and to replace some of the DC-8-51 with DC-8-62, also with new motors. In the final account the COTAM would thus have a fleet of four or five airplanes which could haul 35 tons of cargo at a distance in excess of 6,000 kilometers. The point is that the DC-8 is not a military cargo plane. It cannot use rough landing strips and requires a relatively substantial amount of loading and unloading facilities. This is a problem which has led the COTAM to strengthen its mobile landing facilities.

Thus equipped, the French military air transport will be properly supplied to meet the requirements of the armed forces for many years ahead, bearing in mind the traditional longevity of transport airplanes.

The COTAM Fleet

The Military Air Transport Command has currently a fleet of 229 airplanes and 105 helicopters. Some of them, such as the Mystere 50, recently received, are used for liaison and personnel transportation. Most of the cargo transport capacities are those of the Transall, Nord 2501, and DC-8. More specifically, the fleet can be broken down as follows: 48 Transall C-160; 87 Nord 2501; 21 Nord 262; 5 Caravelle; 21 Morane Paris; 7 Mystere 20; 1 Mystere 50; 5 DC-8; 4 Twin Otter; 23 Troussard; 24 Puma; 44 Alouette II; and 37 Alouette III.

5157

CSO: 3100

REVELATIONS OF BRITISH INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

Rome IL BORGHESE in Italian 10 Feb 80 pp 329-330

[Article by Aldo De Quarto: "Invasion of Malta? MI5 Operative's Secrets Gathered For Us"]

[Text] London--The affair is beginning to seriously worry the British government of Margaret Thatcher. She has just barely awakened the Admiralty from its torpor by sending Her Majesty's naval squadron to the Indian Ocean and once more keeping an eye on the Mediterranean, which had been abandoned by the Labourites. This is contained in a classified report that reached London and the NATO high command.

Despite everything, it is clear, the British continue to have an excellent antenna on the Island of Malta even if the British Lion, weakened by the surrender of the Labourites, has lost many teeth. But now the "iron maiden," as they say in London, has decided to "give it a strong set of teeth."

From the time when on 31 March 1979 Her Britannic Majesty's last soldier left the island and London ceased to send it royalties for the use of Malta as an aero-naval base, the ex-British fortress every day fell more securely into the hands of the Libyan colonel. Qadhafi, who ensures that financial requirements will be met and abundantly fills the void of chronic deficit, is demanding more and more in exchange for his "generosity." It is enough to think that the capital of 77 percent of Maltese businesses is now entirely Libyan and that the Arabic has become obligatory in the schools. The report does not exaggerate when it says that "Malta has sunk into a complete state of dependency on Tripoli," to such a point that recently in the People's Council (the Libyan assembly) Col Qadhafi expressed hope that the Maltese would purely and simply accept their integration into the Libyan Jamahiriya. But Libyan intelligence, well established at La Valletta under a false name, well knows that more than half the Maltese population still feels European and not Arab-Levantine, despite its dialect and propaganda from certain sources. This is why, for some time, various incidents which were carefully "teleguided" if not actually manipulated, were obviously aimed at creating a clash between the two rival "clans" of the island, the socialists and nationalists, so that at a certain point the former, with their backs to the wall, would be forced to appeal to "sister" Libya and to the "friendly powers" to protect the island from "imperialist aggression."

The assiduous (if not permanent) presence in port of missile-launching cruisers and submarines carrying the Libyan flag do not justify the extensive work to broaden the arsenal for naval repairs, once destined for the Royal Navy and for NATO ships. These can no longer drop anchor at the island. From Tripoli, from Benghazi and Tobruk, the "aero-naval bridge" of 300 kilometers would not be difficult for "liberators" of the Afghanistan type. The British Admiralty, which as I have said, recently woke up in what at one time was its "privileged zone," sent the report also to Toulon, base of the French Royale, which also for the past few months has been strengthened by naval units to "observe" the western and central Mediterranean.

The conclusion of the report is explicit: Qadhdhafi is paving the way for the Soviet fleet in the Black Sea, which is still seeking a true fixed support-base. It is not satisfied with the tiny port granted it by Karamanlis, in Greece, apparently only for the use of "nonoffensive units." The British report is precise. Even though Malta apparently as of today is enveloped in a typically calm and Britannic climate, the logical consequences of almost 2 centuries of British presence, a secret and silent war is going on for the total control of those few rocky square kilometers, 100 kilometers from the Sicilian shores and 300 from Tripoli.

It is clear that the antenna of MI5, the new [as published] British intelligence service, have managed to remain in the shadows, limiting themselves to observing over the passage of months the peaceful invasion of the Libyans camouflaged as a cultural center, as a technological institute, in order later to enter the military bases and the banks, not to speak of the import-export companies and the petroleum companies which are in close contact with the Sliema Embassy in the residential quarter, half-way between La Valletta and San Giorgio. From the time when NATO had to abandon the island, the Americans, who are no longer permitted to anchor their ships, lost interest in the problem, and limited themselves to some "observers," whose task is to keep a low profile concerning events. But the London station has resumed its interest in Malta and for the time being, the Americans are consulting with their English "cousins" who have submitted their report on the island. Libya, as the document demonstrates, has infiltrated all the vital Maltese sectors: Military cooperation, technical-industrial training, commerce, investments, banks. With the possible mooring of the Russian fleet in Malta, Moscow would take possession of the strategic "key" that controls all the obligatory routes of Western Europe, from Naples to Port Said, from the Bosphorus to Gibraltar, not to mention the Sicilian Channel. By installing long-range giant radar, the Russians and Libyans could keep surveillance over the area north of Italy and to south even over Israel and Egypt.

Dom Mintoff, the present Labourite prime minister, who won the elections even thanks to the support of Italian state television, is giving away the island and its independence piece by piece, both for ideological reasons and for economic reasons. No one in Europe wanted to help Malta. The departure of the British caused the Maltese to lose their main resource: 19 million pounds sterling per year. This is a lot for such a small island. Then the

Libyans arrived and Mintoff opened his eyes wide: "We will give you double what you have lost and in the meantime we will forget the problem that divides us: Petroleum." It was fact, but until when?

And then, what has petroleum got to do with it? It seems that it is involved, and how. According to experts, the entire underwater area between the island and Libya is reported to be rich in petroleum. They are reported to be the extensions of the Libyan deposits and research was done several years ago by some large Western companies. Could Malta tomorrow, therefore, be transformed into a Kuwait? It seems so. But then, why don't either the Libyans or the Maltese do something? Because there is a quarrel about it: Malta wants a 50-50 share while Qadhdhafi wants 75 percent. And there is also a certain threat: "If you appeal to the West and you begin exploitation, our missile-launching ships will blow everything up." This discussion, or monolog, has been in progress for 2 years, but Mintoff has no voice in the centers of decision compared with Qadhdhafi; there is no one behind him who will defend him and Libya continues to "siphon" "its" petroleum. And it lends money to Malta the poor one, the "Malta azim be takul sardina," as the Libyans say derisively, that is, "the great Malta which eats sardines."

However, the report goes beyond that and explains strange things. Has the Maltese government renounced "its" future petroleum to avoid opposing Qadhdhafi? That is not entirely true. The fact is that there are quite a few in the Labourite government who receive Libyan bribes in order to keep quiet. Furthermore, it must not be forgotten that the Labourites govern with a small majority: 35 seats against 31 controlled by the nationalists. This is why Qadhdhafi did everything possible to prevent a possible success of the conservatives in the coming elections, openly financing Mintoff's party. The nationalists know all these things. But perhaps it is already too late to react, unless they fall into the trap of a popular revolt. If pressed, Dom Mintoff would play the Libyan-Soviet game. There would then be an invasion: A "mini-Kabul" only 100 miles from Italy.

My informer explained to me with elementary clarity, "The post-Kabul and the post-Tito period will necessarily push Italy into the front line, with Malta as the advanced Russian point if Qadhdhafi's plan is realized and with the plains of Gorizia and Trieste within range of Soviet tanks. The only thing lacking would be a government of national unity in Rome," the Britisher said with humor, "with Berlinguer as vice-president of the cabinet, and we Westerners would also have our Finland. The United States Sixth Fleet and the NATO missile squadrons would be forced to withdraw from Italy to rearguard positions in Spain. France would shift its Pluton to Savoia and to Modane. Switzerland would mobilize the Ticino Canton, while Austria would close the Brenner Pass. John Paul II would return to breathe the air of his own home feeling as if he were in Krakow, not in Rome. And after several months, Craxi and company would meet in prison camps to recall the glorious Byzantine battles of the defunct Italian Republic."

Is this fantasy-politics made up by this gentleman, who resembles a Cambridge professor but has nerves of steel and cold purposeful eyes? He answers: "Absolutely not, because I love Italy, but I don't understand anything any more about you Italians." Unfortunately, he is not alone. In the meanwhile, without the noise of drums and tank tracks, 100 kilometers from the "beloved shores," a "mini-Kabul" might tomorrow surprise us and strangle us.

6034

CSO: 3104

DUTCH GOVERNMENT CONCERNED OVER EVENTS IN SURINAM

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 29 Feb 80 p 5

[Article: "The Hague and the New Surinam Regime"]

[Text] pmr. Brussels, 26 February--In the Netherlands the developments in the former South American colony of Surinam are observed with concern. In the light of the insecure situation following the uprising of the noncommissioned officers, the Foreign Ministry in The Hague refrained from making any official comments on Tuesday. A spokesman only said that the continuation of developing aid was not jeopardized, as The Hague was contractually obligated to grant this aid. When Surinam attained independence on 25 November 1975, the Netherlands had undertaken to grant comprehensive aid amounting to approximately 3.5 billion guilders. Due to inadequate administration, however, Paramaribo is lagging far behind in claiming the money.

Fear of Wave of Immigration

There is unofficial concern in the Netherlands that the outbreak of a new wave of immigrants could sweep the former mother country. These last weeks the airlines had reported a marked decrease in bookings from Paramaribo to Amsterdam. It was supposed that many Surinamese wanted to wait until the parliamentary elections, which were set for 27 March, were over. Since the declaration of independence tens of thousands of Surinamese have frequently chosen a poor existence in the Netherlands instead of economic and social chaos in their home country. Within a 5-year transition period, which will elapse on 25 November of this year, they are permitted to enter the Netherlands without formal documents. The purchase of a flight ticket will suffice. The authorities of the Netherlands will then issue a residence permit subject to the "vacationer" finding work and accommodation within 3 months. Many immigrants succeed in doing so, because they are willing to take poorly paid and dirty jobs despised by the native Dutch. Reuniting the family and studies in the Netherlands will also entitle the applicant to receive a permit.

There are only rough estimates as to the number of Surinamese living in the Netherlands--between 150,000 and 250,000. The statistical problems are

insurmountable because, on the one hand, many immigrants hold a regular passport of the Netherlands, and on the other hand there is a host of Surinamese who will remain there illegally after those 3 months have elapsed. Official sources quote last year's number of immigrants as being 15,800. The population in Surinam itself is estimated to be about 450,000. Some Surinamese living in the Netherlands express hope that the uprising of the noncommissioned officers, who apparently are very well liked by the native population, will bring about an improvement of the economic and political situation and could thus initiate a reversal of the emigration wave. Only few fear that the noncommissioned officers could establish a typical Latin American junta regime.

9544

CSO: 3103

IF USSR CONCERNED ABOUT BASE POLICY, IT SHOULD USE DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 23 Feb 80 p 4

[Editorial]

[Text] Soviet diplomacy, or more accurately its lack of diplomacy, with regard to Norway appears quite strange at times. At regular intervals the Soviet leaders say they want good neighborly relations with Norway. At the same time they like to stress that the unsolved problems in relations between the two countries must be solved in a spirit of mutual understanding and trust. Even so we have recently witnessed several moves in the Soviet press that are not in accordance with this ideal spirit in substance or in form.

We are referring in this connection to the warnings directed to Norway earlier this week by the party organ, PRAVDA. In threatening articles the paper charged that Norway has violated its base and nuclear policy and that the unfriendly actions of the Norwegian government have broken all the rules for good neighborly relations with the Soviet Union.

The starting point for PRAVDA's comments was evidently the reports in the western press that Norway and the United States had agreed to store American military equipment in North Norway prior to an actual war situation.

"From reports in the western press and confused, half-hearted denials by official Norwegian representatives it appears that these depots could easily contain, behind the closed doors, parts for tactical nuclear weapons which are part of the 'standard equipment' of the American forces," wrote PRAVDA, adding that our policy "could have consequences." The party organ also made other accusations against Norway although we see no reason to report all of them here. The TASS correspondent in Oslo has also followed the same line as PRAVDA.

Let us make things absolutely clear. There are no plans at all to change Norway's base and nuclear policy. In practice this means that

Norway will not allow the storage of nuclear weapons or the stationing of foreign troops on Norwegian soil in peacetime. In our opinion any deviation from this policy in the current tense international situation would represent a dangerous gamble with peace.

With regard to advance storage of American military equipment on Norwegian soil we would like to remind the Soviet authorities that negotiations on this matter have not yet begun. The necessary clarification of economic and practical issues in this connection will take a lot of time.

As everyone knows the military situation in the northern region has changed considerably in the last 10 years, mainly because of the large-scale Soviet arms build-up in the Murmansk area. Of course Norway can not remain passive in the face of this development. In cooperation with our NATO partners we must take the necessary steps to maintain a credible defense.

There is no doubt that the Soviet build-up of forces in the north has created a need for more rapid allied support in a crisis. But at the same time it is our policy to avoid an arrangement calling for allied help before it is needed. In a crisis this can only lead to further escalation and increased tension. But by storing heavy equipment in advance we will reduce the possibility for such a development. This does not undermine our base policy, it just gives it more credibility.

We will not indulge here in speculations about the background for the unfounded Soviet accusations. But if for some reason or another the Soviet authorities feel a need to express their concern to Norway we think this would be best done through regular diplomatic channels and not through uncontrolled attacks in the Soviet press. The former would be in the spirit of good neighborly relations.

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CSO: 3108

LABOR PARTY CHAIRMAN STEEN URGES GREATER DETENTE EFFORT

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 23 Feb 80 p 5

[Commentary by Reiulf Steen]

[Text] In the last few months we have seen a development that could jeopardize years and decades of painstaking efforts for peace. The detente process has been transformed into a frigid climate between the superpowers.

One can see the insanity of this situation in the uncertainty felt by most people in both East and West and in the use of resources in a world dominated by economic decline, underdevelopment and hunger. The world spends 5 million kroner a minute on military purposes. The nuclear arsenal of the superpowers has an explosive force equal to 1 million Hiroshima-type bombs. This is no more comprehensible when a 1-megaton nuclear bomb is "translated" into enough dynamite to fill a freight train reaching farther than from Lindesnes to Kirkenes.

At the same time 14 times as much money is spent each year for military purposes than for all forms of development aid. In 1977 the money spent on the UN peacekeeping operations was the same as that spent in 3 hours by the military establishments of the world.

But the gravity of the international situation also opens up opportunities. We have a unique chance to contribute to a joint international declaration of the need to reduce tension. We must prevent the breakdown of the processes that can guarantee orderly changes in the world community. This must now be the superordinate goal of all those who want to work against the development of another war and who want the detente process to continue. Regardless of what Lars Roar Langslet has to say about this we must work to keep as many channels as possible open and to continue the dialogue wherever we can. This applies to mutual and balanced arms reductions in Europe, it applies to the European Conference on Security and Cooperation (ECSC) and it applies to efforts to start negotiations on the so-called "gray zone weapons" so that the location of more and more new nuclear weapons in Europe can be prevented.

We must not automatically and blindly accept the idea that there is only one way out of the unfortunate situation we now find ourselves in. We must make it clear that there is no alternative to detente in the long run. Therefore we must also take the initiative.

It could be especially effective to expand our contacts with the Third World. In connection with the intervention in Afghanistan most of the Third World countries again demonstrated their integrity and independence. They have not sold out to either side in the traditional East-West conflict. Through the close contacts Norway has made with these countries we should work with them to take joint initiatives to have the dialogue between East and West resumed and combined with a joint program to eradicate poverty in the world. In this way we could form a constructive program for peace, freedom and social security.

A new economic world system means changes in the form of increased fairness in the division of world resources and incomes. In reality it is a fundamental security problem for the entire industrialized world to decide how we can arrange our society so as to use a relatively smaller share of the total resources of the world. The time is past when developing nations will and can stand with their caps in their hands before the industrialized world.

The primary security problem of the 1980's is lack of stability. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is one aspect of this picture. The growing unrest in the world makes more detente, not less, necessary. We need more respect for human rights, not less. Only approved governments, not repressive juntas, can guarantee a stable development in the long run.

We need to reach a concrete understanding with developing nations on economic issues. We must flesh out the concept of a "new economic world system." Therefore we cannot allow fear of the Soviet Union to determine our global security policy. That would be the surest way to paralyze ourselves in dealing with the tasks confronting us.

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CSO: 3108

COURT DISMISSES RACE CHARGE AGAINST NEO-NAZI PARTY

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 23 Feb 80 p 3

[Article by Kare Rennestraum]

[Text] Attorney General Magnar Flornes decided Friday that no charges would be brought against the Norwegian Front, Erik Blucher or Vivi Krogh, the leader of the Organization Against Harmful Immigration in Norway. They had been accused of racially discriminatory statements and writings. The attorney general had reservations about his decision. The trial issue was considered on the basis of Paragraph 135a of the Penal Code--the so-called racial discrimination paragraph--and Paragraph 100 in the constitution dealing with freedom of speech.

Public prosecutor Ole Haugstad told HALDEN ARBEIDERBLAD that all the cases had been dismissed partly because of the status of the evidence and partly because some of the statements cannot be considered illegal.

With regard to the Norwegian Front and Erik Blucher the attorney general said in his conclusion that in both form and content statements, documents and articles indicated a clear and unmistakable attitude toward the issue of immigration, race, religion, etc. This is a consistent attitude expressed with exaggerated intensity.

Some statements clearly overstep the boundaries of factuality. And some others are dangerously close to being punishable under the law, but it is a matter of opinion as to whether or not the legal boundary has been overstepped.

Taking everything into consideration and with some reservations the attorney general decided to drop the charges against Blucher, the Norwegian Front and various subsidiary organizations. The major accuser was the Norwegian Anti-Fascist Committee.

Vivi Krogh was accused by six people in all on the basis of newspaper interviews--appearing in HALDEN ARBEIDERBLAD, DAGBLADET, SORLANDET and VERDENS GANG, among others.

At the Asker and Baerum police office which looked into these charges Vivi Krogh denied having made the statements reproduced in the newspapers. On this basis the attorney general concluded that this would be the word of one side against the other and would not provide a basis for a criminal trial.

Asked if it wasn't remarkable that the subject of an interview would be misquoted in six different papers on the same question, public prosecutor Haugstad answered that of course it was doubtful but that regardless of this the evidence was very flimsy.

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CSO: 3108

NEW OIL FINDS MADE IN NORTH SEA

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 23 Feb 80 p 3

[Text] Two new oil and gas finds have been made in the North Sea. ARBEIDERBLADET has learned that Statoil found more gas in the so-called "silver block" while Norsk Hydro ran into oil in the second drilling in block 31/4.

In block 30/6, the "silver block," the third drill hole is now being tested. They are through with the testing in one of the zones but not in the others. This time too sizable quantities of gas have been found in the blocks as there was in drill hole number 2. More and more experts feel this block may live up to its name. More drilling is needed to chart the block and find out what it contains.

Norsk Hydro became the operator of block 31/4 in the assignments made last summer. The first drilling in this block was a great disappointment and the drill hole turned up totally negative results. There has been some encouragement from the second drilling in a new structure of the block. It is still too early to reach any conclusions about the contents of the block.

Official confirmation is expected within a relatively short time on the two finds that have now been made in the North Sea. Several other exciting drilling operations are under way. Statoil is waiting eagerly for the outcome of the last drilling done in block 34/10. Work here is being pushed with the idea of having the block--the "gold block" as it is called--officially declared economically worth operating, allowing construction at the site.

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CSO: 3108

MARIT LANDSEM BERNTSEN AT ODDS WITH THE NKP'S 'MUSCOVITES'

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 19 Jan 80 p 7

[Article by Terje Svabo]

[Text] "I would advise Martin Gunnar Knutsen to change his mind." This is Marit Landsem Berntsen's response to the news that the chairman of the Norwegian Communist Party (NKP) has hinted at the possibility of bringing a suit for libel against Finn Gustavsen, who claimed that Knutsen has struck Marit Landsem Berntsen. She has resigned from her duties in the party because of the NKP's support for the Soviet Union's incursion into Afghanistan, but she emphasizes that she continues to be a committed communist. She claims that Martin Gunnar Knutsen is a very poor party chairman and that the party ought to evaluate its leaders.

Appropriately enough, Marit Landsem Berntsen was born on 1 May, almost 35 years ago. She is employed as an editor by Universitetsforlaget [The University Press]. She is married and has two sons, who are 6 and 10 years old. The older boy feels very uneasy about the recent publicity concerning his mother, and would prefer to be done with all of the interviews.

Originally from Malm in Nord-Trondelag County, Marit Landsem Berntsen moved to Oslo when she was 16 years old, and during her first years in the city she worked in a store and an office. "I have experienced exploitation," she says, "and think of the long days working from seven in the morning to seven at night for low wages." If today she is occupying an editor's chair at a publishing house, this is due to her own hard work. She pursued her education in the evenings with the help of correspondence courses. Her area of responsibility in the publishing company is the evaluation of books in the field of health and social studies for secondary schools.

[Question] Why did she become so active in the Norwegian Communist Party?

Marit Landsem Berntsen gives this answer: "I grew up in a typical working-class environment but, in addition to this, my parents were Laestadians [fundamentalist Christian group]. There were six of us children, and father was a miner. While growing up I came to feel very strongly the inequalities and injustices in the small mining community. I was aware of the social lines of demarcation long before I became active in politics."

"I will never forget the day my father, who had worked for 40 years in the mines, was supposed to receive the medal of honor. It was marked by tidings brought to our house in one of the large, black automobiles belonging to the Fosdalen Mine. In the kitchen a bouquet of flowers was presented to father, which he accepted with his head bowed. I do not think that my father sensed the humility, but I did."

In Oslo Marit Landsem Berntsen came into contact with the political milieu, and in 1964 she joined Norway's Communist Youth League. In 1973 she received a position of trust in its mother party. Now she has resigned her post in the party's Executive Committee (sentralstyre) and National Committee (landsstyre) in protest against the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan.

[Question] Will you resign completely from the party?

[Answer] I want to take it easy and assess the situation. What happened in connection with the resolution supporting the invasion of Afghanistan is a total departure from the principles which I associate with the NKP. For me, working toward peace, detente and disarmament is of overriding importance, and, this being the case, I cannot support such an invasion.

[Question] Did this resolution come about because Martin Gunnar Knutsen is chairman of the NKP?

[Answer] Martin Gunnar Knutsen is a very poor party chairman; both his political line and his way of running the party are crazy. There is no hiding the fact that the NKP is a small party and that the isolation it is entering by virtue of its support for the invasion can have the most serious consequences for the party.

The NKP ought seriously to assess its leadership. I cannot see how the party can do with Martin Gunnar Knutsen continuing to serve as chairman. He cuts a very poor figure. He puts the sort of stamp on our politics which throws doubts upon the reliability of the party's policy.

[Question] You have yourself deplored the fact that, rather than the tragedy which is unfolding in Afghanistan, it is the story about Martin Gunnar Knutsen having allegedly struck you which has dominated the news scene. Can you now tell us what really happened?

[Answer] I do not wish to comment on that matter at this time.

[Question] Finn Gustavsen emphasizes that he is standing by the contentions made in his latest book that you were struck by Martin Gunnar Knutsen. The chairman of the NKP is hinting at possible court proceedings against Gustavsen. What is your comment about all this?

[Answer] I see that Martin Gunnar Knutsen is contemplating court action. If I were to give him some advice, it would be that he reconsider.

The interview with Marit Landsæm Berntsen takes place in her office, which conveys the impression that Scandinavia's largest publishing house has found an active editor for itself. The way in which she expresses herself, her argumentation, and her charm suggests that Martin Gunnar Knutsen faced a powerful adversary when the National Committee took up the invasion of Afghanistan last Monday and on Thursday of the previous week.

[Question] Can you confirm that the view which you represent was held by the majority at Thursday's Party Executive Committee meeting?

[Answer] That is correct. The party leadership, however, asked us not to reach a final decision on Thursday, arguing that we would have plenty of time in which to take it up. We submitted to this argument in spite of the fact that we could have gotten a majority at that time opposed to giving support to the invasion.

[Question] What happened over the weekend?

[Answer] At Monday's meeting there were a larger number of regular members of the National Committee present than at Thursday's meeting and, in addition, some members of the Executive Committee had changed their views.

[Question] The NKP is known for its close ties to the Soviet Union. How do you view the Soviet Union?

[Answer] It is a multifaceted country.

[Question] Is it a free country?

[Answer] That is a key question. When we consider the question apart from the country's history, I have a very great respect for the Soviet people. I am not at all willing to associate myself with some general anti-Soviet agitation. But I also reserve for myself the right to make my own appraisal of what is happening in the Soviet Union without being branded as anti-Soviet.

[Question] Do you condemn the acts of political tyranny which take place in the Soviet Union?

[Answer] If and when such acts of tyranny occur I shall certainly condemn them, but I do not want to be involved in any anti-Soviet agitation. I would also like to base my information on something other than what is put forth in the bourgeois press. Besides, I want to say that all of these so-called opposition currents which make headlines in the West are blown all out of proportion and fade rapidly into insignificance when we become better acquainted with them.

[Question] Have the last few days been burdensome to you personally?

[Answer] It is difficult for me to define my feelings in this matter. For me, the most essential thing was to work toward helping the NKP to avoid taking the disastrous position which, unfortunately, won the support of a majority. It was the desire to underscore sharply the need for peace, detente and disarmament which motivated me to do what I did. Also, I want to point out that this is the first time I am going out in public and criticizing the policy of the party, but this time I was not able to refrain from stating my view.

[Question] Did you wish to express your views at the press conference following the meeting of the Executive Committee?

[Answer] This was taken up by representatives of the minority at the Executive Committee meeting. However, the idea that the minority should get to present its views was vetoed.

[Question] Is it a question of time before you leave the party?

[Answer] "For me, the most important thing now is we have an open, straightforward debate within the party concerning its leadership and its support of the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan. It is the outcome of this discussion which will be decisive for me," emphasizes Marit Landsem Berntsen.

CSO: 8139

CIVILIANS BECOME SOLDIERS IN 'ANORAK EXPRESS' EXERCISE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 4 Mar 80 p 4

[Article by Knut Falchenberg]

[Text] Hauerseter, 3 Mar--It took only 3 and 1/2 hours yesterday to transform 300 civilians into fully-equipped Norwegian soldiers, ready for the trip to Bardufoss. Things have to move that fast when reinforcements are needed for North Norway from the south. The men met at Hauerseter, north of Jessheim. They will make up the Norwegian part of the multinational NATO "fire brigade."

The NATO exercise, "Anorak Express," is underway. In all 18,000 men will take part on Norwegian soil.

"I'm treating the whole thing as a vacation from my job," Tore Martinsen of Skjeberg told AFTENPOSTEN. He was called up for his first refresher training course as a participant in the NATO exercise. The first stop is the camp at Hauerseter where 300 men from the Transport Regiment are given medical check-ups and equipment before being sent north.

Everything must be done quickly. There is a sense of urgency everywhere. Private Martinsen didn't mind going outside to change from civilian clothes to his uniform beside a snow drift.

"It's better to change clothes outside in the cold than inside in that crowd," he said. He will not be allowed to take a single item of civilian clothing along with him to the north. All personal articles are packed in large paper bags, marked with names of the owners and stored at Hauerseter.

Under Foreign Command

All those who showed up except one will be assisting the 5000-man NATO "fire brigade" during the exercise. The exception was a future UN soldier who had started his medical exam and X-rays before he found he was

in the wrong camp. When he heard the trip was going north and not to Lebanon he made a hasty retreat.

The others who showed up will be under Norwegian command until 9 March when they will be transferred to the multinational NATO "fire brigade" (AMF). The Norwegian transport company except for 275 men will then become part of a British supply battalion in AMF. The 19-man armored car units will be divided up among the Canadian, British and Italian combat troops while the 19 Norwegian military policemen will be transferred to an MP unit with a British commander.

Three Weeks in Tents

But on the first day in Hauerseter it wasn't the allied operation the men were concerned with. It was more important to grab a hot dog from the military mobile canteen. And everyone had to remember to bring an officially issued package of sandwiches along for the plane trip from Gardermoen to Bardufoss later on that day.

For 3 weeks the men from the Transport Regiment will be living in tents. To help them make it through they were issued 46 items today including rifles and reflecting pallets. Except for the sleeping bags, which were new, most of the clothing issued was used, some of it well-worn. That is because for reasons of economy the armed forces are holding back the newest and best of the military equipment in depots that will be opened only when they really have to be. Older materiel is used during exercises.

Three Weeks Without Pay

Private Arne Aker from Horten had mixed feelings about the prospect of 3 weeks of refresher training. In everyday life he earns a living by driving a truck.

"Now I have to go 3 weeks without pay. I don't have a family either so all I'll get is the regular military allowance, meaning that I'll lose at least 4000 kroner in wages," he said.

It isn't just the pay that will be different for Private Aker. If he has to drive a military truck during the exercises it will be quite different from the trucks he drives in civilian life. The armed forces still have quite a few trucks that were produced in the 1940's.

It is still not known when the army will be able to replace these trucks even though spare parts are hard to find and the old models have several weaknesses. Among other things modern communications systems make greater demands on electrical current supplies than the older models can deliver.

SOUTHERN AREA NAVAL CHIEF: SECURITY COMMISSION HAS WRONG VIEW

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 3 Mar 80 p 5

[Article by Liv Hegna]

[Text] "Why is there so little political understanding of the significance of the sea?" asked the commander of naval forces in southern Norway, Rear Admiral Gustav A. Steimler. "The Defense Commission did not recommend making the navy capable of maintaining Norwegian sovereignty outside the Norwegian coastline," he said. "Instead reducing the navy by 25 percent is being considered.

"The Defense Commission bases its evaluation of the armed forces on the nation's economic capability. But this is not the right point of departure, at least not from a military viewpoint. One should first determine what the threat is," Admiral Steimler said.

With regard to the defense analysis underlying the commission's report Steimler says it is based on hypothetical situations, based on probable enemy action patterns viewed with Norwegian eyes. "But an enemy never acts the way we think he is going to. At least it's pretty certain that he won't act in the way we have predicted. History is full of examples supporting this," the rear admiral said. He is worried that the defense analysis referred to has been assigned greater importance than it deserves.

Steimler also points out that the mandate of the commission called for a balance between quality and quantity. "But to say that quality will automatically offset quantity is highly debatable from a naval point of view. This is particularly true in Norway where our long coastline requires a relatively large number of units to provide adequate defense coverage. On the other hand, due to our unique topography we can renounce quality," Steimler said.

But isn't the navy very concerned with quality in general?

"It is true that we have had a tendency to demand only the best. When prices rise this means we have to cut down on quantity. But on many exercises the naval forces have shown that we could very well scale down our demands a little when it comes to extremely high technical quality."

Rear Admiral Steimler also said there is very little enthusiasm in the work of the Defense Commission with regard to making Norway a link in the NATO cooperation. "Politicians and others are worried about how we can defend our air bases while ports are mentioned only in passing. But the fact that 90 percent of our reinforcements would have to arrive by sea makes it imperative that we in Norway do all we can to make sure this is possible. With this in mind I find it unfortunate that the Defense Commission found no room for escort vessels such as frigates in future defense plans," Steimler said. He said a similar criticism could be made of the commission's treatment of our minesweepers.

"We know that the Soviet Union has an enormous minelaying capacity. The Soviet Union has traditionally been the leading nation in that area. Thus one of our biggest jobs in a war would be to keep Norwegian port areas free of mines," said Rear Admiral Steimler who said if he were the allied naval commander he would think things over very carefully before sending his ships to Norway if he knew there were no escort ships available there and that there was no guarantee that the harbors were free of mines.

We asked if the military importance of southern Norway had increased in recent years and Steimler replied, "Soviet mobility along with the enormous build-up of forces there have made southern Norway too an exposed area but not to the same extent as northern Norway. The line between Iceland, the Faeroes and the Shetland Islands is the forward line of defense and Norway is located behind that line. Therefore we need to concentrate more on being able to take care of ourselves, at least for a while. The biggest threat to Norway both in the south and in northern waters is from the sea. But that is also the direction from which help can come. For this reason we should be enabled to control our harbor areas as well as we can," Rear Admiral Gustav A. Steimler said.

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CSO: 3108

DEFENSE FORCES TO IMPROVE COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 12 Feb 80 p 26

[Article by Knut Falchenberg]

[Text] New data technology costing between 100 and 150 million kroner will drastically improve communications security in the armed forces starting in the mid-1980's. It will become harder or close to impossible for outsiders to listen in on the nationwide military telecommunications network. At the same time modernization will insure that new data services can be employed without running into bottlenecks in the communications network. The system will also be fairly resistant to electronic warfare, AFTENPOSTEN has learned.

The armed forces have their own communications network which covers the entire country. While the teletype network is more old-fashioned the telephone network was computerized 5 years ago. In other words when one calls military long distance the call is completed by a computer instead of mechanized central stations.

The next step in the modernization will occur soon, the transmission of telesignals from one station to another. The transmission occurs via cable or via radio lines placed in the country.

The idea is that all telecommunications between stations will be carried out in code. This will apply to ordinary phone calls, teletype messages and computer transmissions. The new system will automatically encode all messages sent. When the message arrives at the other end it will automatically be rendered into clear text on a teletypewriter or clear language on the telephone.

With today's technical equipment it is impossible to encode all the messages sent out over the military telecommunications network and it is widely known that it is technically possible to listen in on the military communications network.

The planned modernization will in addition to improving communications security drastically also give the network a capacity large enough to handle new services. Even now the armed forces have several computer lines in use since all branches of the armed forces have computers that need to "talk to each other" during the regular working day. But in the future the armed forces will be using new computer lines for running military activities minute by minute. The first announcement came from the air force with its planned computer system for command and supervision. According to plans this system, known as NORCCIS [expansion unknown], will link command centers, air bases and supervision and warning stations all over the country. When this goes into operation the large amount of data will require a fully modern telecommunications network.

In January the leaders of the armed forces made a formal decision to modernize the military communications network. In the summer before that a joint study was made by the armed forces in cooperation with the Defense Research Institute. Further steps will be under the direction of a working group of experts from these two institutions and representatives of the air force supply division and the civilian consultant firm, Informationskontroll, Inc.

People in the armed forces hope that much of the million-kroner contract for modernization can go to Norwegian industries. Last Friday an orientation meeting was held in which three firms participated: Elektrisk Bureau, Siemens and Standard Telephone and Cable.

It is anticipated that the first contracts can be signed in the first half of 1981 and that the first deliveries can be made in 1983 or 1984. AFTENPOSTEN was told that the entire new communications network should be completed in 1986.

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CSO: 3108

BRIEFS

NAVY OFFICERS QUIT--The navy is losing officers to the oil industry. In 1979 there was an extra large departure of younger newly-trained officers. Most of them went to the Oil Directorate or to offshore activities. The commercial fleet and the Marine Charting Agency also provide better conditions than the navy which is now short a total of 50 officers onboard operative naval vessels, according to FORSVARETS FORUM. The Oil Directorate is one of the agencies that is eager to get people with administrative and technical training from the navy. [Text] [Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 19 Feb 80 p 8] 6578

YOUNG SOCIALISTS WANT MOSCOW GAMES--The Socialist Youth national committee calls on Norwegian sports people to go to the Moscow Olympic Games, according to a statement issued. It is far more effective to condemn the invasion in direct contact with East European sports people than to close the borders, the statement went on. [Text] [Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 21 Feb 80 p 6] 6578

CSO: 3108

COMMENTARY: AD SUPPORT FOR EANES SEEN AS IMPOSSIBLE

Lisbon A TARDE in Portuguese 29 Feb 80 pp 5, 11

[Text] We are still about 10 months away from the next presidential elections. Nevertheless, it would not be presumptuous to say that we are already in a sort of pre-electoral campaign, in which various parties are engaged in examining and selecting possible candidates and evaluating the chances that their chosen candidate will succeed with the electorate. At bottom, however, they know that the real battle will be between the candidates who are supported by the AD [Democratic Alliance] or the present opposition forces.

It is also apparent that, although he has made no formal announcement, the present president of the republic is determined to run again and, if he does, he doubtless has some chance of winning.

It is also obvious that Ramalho Eanes can be elected only if the forces opposing him, above all the forces of the Democratic Alliance, lack the necessary vision and patriotism to agree on the choice of a common candidate, civilian or military, with enough charisma and prestige to capture the support, not only of his own backers, but of other sectors of the electorate, especially those in the area between the PSD [Social Democratic Party] and the PS [Socialist Party].

It would not be out of the way to note that, in presidential elections, many of the voters are motivated, not by respect for party directives, but mainly by the sympathy and trust that the various candidates can inspire.

Incidentally, this was well-proved in the 1976 presidential election. From the votes won by the various candidates, it was clear that many voters, with various political affiliations, did not accept their parties' slates. This is the only way to explain the votes won, for example, by Otelo Saraivo de Carvalho and Pinheiro de Azevedo. It is also the only way to explain the 7 percent that went to Otavio Pato, when his party has always won between 15 and 20 percent of the vote in parliamentary and local elections.

All this explains why the choice of candidates and their launching is extraordinarily important; it also explains why the major political forces are already deeply absorbed in the problem. Its importance dictates an extremely critical search, in which all the factors must be very rigorously and objectively examined.

In addition, only a double victory is of any significance, particularly for the AD; that is, a victory in next October's parliamentary elections must be accompanied by the election of a new president from, or sponsored by, the AD.

This was already mentioned here in a recent article, but it is extremely important to note, so that everyone understands and no one forgets it, because another AD victory in October, which is quite possible, followed by the election of a president sponsored by the Socialist and Marxist forces, would not only manacle the AD government but would bring the country to a new stalemate. The AD would find it impossible to govern, with the constant blocking of its initiatives and the confrontation that would inevitably ensue.

Nor should it be forgotten that the next parliament will have constituent powers; the vitally important task of rewriting the present constitution.

Let us return to the possibility (practically the certainty) that General Eanes will run again.

It is quite possible that he will officially announce his candidacy on 25 April, or perhaps later, on 10 June, since General Eanes has always been partial to these dates for his important addresses and his more controversial statements. If he does, who will support him?

It is already being said that no candidate can be elected without the support of the AD or the Marxist-Socialist opposition. Therefore, if he runs again, Eanes will have to resort strongly to the support of one of these forces.

Let us see if either of these forces could back his candidacy, enabling him to remain in Belem for 5 more years, as he seems to want.

Will this support come from the AD?

No, we don't think the AD would support another term for Ramalho Eanes.

If it did so, it would be disavowing the very clear and firm decisions of its two major parties and a stand clearly and firmly taken by the most prominent leaders of both the PSD and the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party], including the frequent and quite clear statements of Sa Carneiro and Freitas do Amaral.

Knowing both these men, and knowing their dignity and their character, it is certain that neither of them will disavow stands they have taken quite openly, not to support the candidacy of the present occupant of the Belem Palace for another term.

Moreover, we do not believe the AD as a whole, or any one of the parties it comprises, will risk a possible agreement with the PS to elect and support a common candidate, which in this case would most probably be Ramalho Eanes.

We will go even farther: we do not think there is the least chance of an understanding between the AD and the PS in the next few years, or between the Socialists and any of the major parties of the present majority.

And the more the PS is bogged down in its traditional ambiguity and its fatalistic "adherence" to the Communists, which is increasingly evident, the less likely such an understanding becomes.

If the AD, either alone or in association with the PS, were to support Ramalho Eanes, most of its voters would not go along, and it would even seriously jeopardize its expected and necessary victory in the October parliamentary elections.

From what we have been able to observe in our day-to-day contacts, it would be political suicide for the AD to support Eanes and present him as its candidate, and it would mean the political end of the leaders of its two principal parties, above all Sa Carneiro and Freitas do Amaral, two men who are esteemed and respected precisely for their rectitude, their character and the political honesty of their positions.

Thus, if Eanes is not supported by the AD, and he won't be, the only recourse left to him is to become the candidate of the Socialists (we include here the ASDI [Independent Social Democratic Action], the MSD [Social Democratic Movement] and the UEDS [Lestist Union for Socialist Democracy]), with the support, in a quite possible turnabout, of Cunhal's Communists and those of the extreme left, since the latter have no chance of electing their own candidates.

Although a lot could change between now and December, everything indicates that this could come to be the case.

This would not only explain the actions of Eanes himself, but the slashing attack that his counselors have been conducting against the AD and the government, aimed mainly at Francisco Sa Carneiro, who is seen as the primary obstacle to the execution of their plans.

This is also the meaning of the strategy the PS is developing, and an integral part of that strategy is the recent announcement of the constitution of the so-called Progressive Front, comprising the tiny ASDI, MSD and UEDS, which have virtually no electoral voice.

As an experienced politician, Mario Soares is perfectly well aware that this front will be of no advantage to him in the legislative elections, because the minigroups with which he is forming an alliance have no significance whatever, but he also knows that this appearance of a united left is his last, desperate chance to remain in the "arena of power." Furthermore, he knows that a few thousand more votes can be decisive in a presidential election.

Moreover, both Soares and Eanes know that, in a turnabout, the Communists will be compelled to line up with the Socialists and to vote for the present chief

of state, distasteful as they may find this. Ramalho Eanes is also aware that his only chance of success lies in accepting these red votes--and certainly won't reject them, because to reject them would be to renounce his political career once and for all.

We don't believe he would be very pleased with the idea of ending a distinguished and unexpected political career at the age of 45. *

From all that has been said and remains to be said, this problem of the presidential election is highly important and absorbing.

From now on, everyone will be playing for keeps and, although there are still 10 months before another important election, the battle has already begun.

We will be following it very closely, and promise to take it up here whenever we feel it is useful (certainly it will often be so), because we think the election of the new president is an issue of interest to everyone--the politicians, the possible candidates and, above all, the citizens of this country, who, when all is said and done, will be the ones to decide who will occupy Belem. May they decide wisely.

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CSO: 3101

PROSPECTS FOR SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY IMPROVE

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 9 Feb 80 p 29

[Text] Yesterday, the shipbuilding sector made public the outcome of its productivity during 1979 and, although it remained at the reduced level characteristic of the last 5 years (a drop of 17 percent with respect to the year before), a note of optimism for 1980 was injected by the fact that the backlog of orders has grown substantially with respect to the previous year, the total number of contracts covering 773,364 grt, a figure not reached since the beginning of the crisis in 1974.

Francisco Aparicio Olmos, president of the Association of Spanish Shipbuilders (Construnaves), revealed the general drop in production registered during 1979 (656,188 grt, a drop of 17 percent), but he was optimistic about the number of new contracts for this year and the "efficient and realistic" support which has been received from the administration in an attempt to resolve the crisis of the sector as soon as possible.

During this same time yesterday, the council of ministers approved the bill which will be sent to Parliament regarding the upcoming medium term program for the shipbuilding sector. This program anticipates 24 billion pesetas in financial backing as a remedy for the lack of activity in the large shipyards.

On referring to the number of shipbuilding contracts for 1980, Francisco Aparicio Olmos indicated that these figures represent an "improvement" with respect to previous fiscal years, but by no means are they "the definitive solution to the crisis that has gripped the sector since 1974." At the same time, Javier Garcia Egocheaga, general director of the Iron and Steel Works and Shipbuilding Industries [ISN], noted that the immediate future of the national shipyards is characterized by a 30 percent drop in the level of contracts and activity as compared to the peak levels achieved in 1974 and 1975.

Along these general lines, Garcia Egocheaga pointed out the government's conviction that it had channeled the mid-term solution to the shipbuilding

sector's crisis down the right path, and he cited 1980 as the year in which a great many of the unknowns and problems of the large shipyards will be favorably resolved. Nevertheless, the small and medium-sized shipyards in Spain will present another problem, since they will be forced to concentrate their effort and activity or, at least, to work at a capacity far below that reached in peak periods of past years.

Regarding the sector's productive activity during 1979, Francisco Aparicio pointed out that the national shipyards maintained a reduced level of production characteristic of the last 5 years, with delivered tonnage of--measured in compensated gross tonnage 656,188 grt for the year, indicative of a drop of 17 percent with respect to the figure for 1978 and a drop of almost 40 percent when compared to the maximum historical capacity of the sector.

Job Orders at Good Level

In view of these facts, nevertheless, the president of Construnaves indicated that due to the relatively important undertakings that were contracted for during 1979, the slump in the backlog of orders has been arrested. At the beginning of 1980, total orders were for 1,372,413 grt, of which about 730,000 grt were for Spanish shipowners and the remainder to foreign ones.

Nevertheless, since this level is similar to that of 12 months ago, in the opinion of Construnaves a notable recovery in productive activity is not immediately foreseeable, in part due to the slight relative slowdown registered in the early phases of the productive process (a drop in the laying of keels).

Along with this optimistic note regarding new contracts, one of the problems that the shipbuilding sector will face this year will be the fact that new orders have consisted fundamentally of large ships; as a result, the position of the small-sized shipyards has deteriorated considerably due to overproduction last year (310,448 grt) with respect to its new contracts (201,238 grt) and a consequent reduction in the work reserve.

Reduction of Jobs

In order to combat this fact and, in general, the permanent crisis of the sector that is materializing on both a national and world level, the general director of ISN considered as fundamental the need to culminate successfully the sector's plans for reorganization which, as he pointed out, will be marked by governmental official support and aid to those shipyards and firms that initiate programs of reorganization based on rationalization of costs and productivity.

In relation to this, Garcia Egocheaga pointed out that according to agreements reached by the trade unions, companies and the administration, of the 6,000 jobs that will have to be cut in the sector, at least 2,000 have already been resolved, leaving between 3,500 and 4,000 job cuts in the future. Likewise,

he indicated that the reorganizational plan will necessitate both big salary sacrifices on the part of the workers and a rationalization of financial costs. He added that all of this is necessary before any realistic investment program can be initiated.

According to Mr Garcia Egocheaga, along with the reduction of salaries and financial costs, in the next few years the shipbuilding sector will note a concentration of firms which will necessitate a reduction in the number of national shipyards from approximately 50 now in existence to between 30 and 35. He added that of the 4 big ones 1 will probably close, while the medium-sized ones will go from 12 to 8 or 9. Only about 15 of the 25 existing small-sized shipyards will survive.

Apart from these solutions, the president of Construnaves pointed out that renewed competition in the national shipyards is one of the foremost conditions for the recovery of the sector. For his part, the general director of ISN indicated that such competition could be found in the increased specialization of the sector as well as in technological retraining. A step in the right direction is the future construction of oil platforms.

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END

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